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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1998, governments and international organizations
continued their active efforts to increase regulatory and criminal
enforcement of various laws to stem the tide of transnational
crime. These efforts were reflected in the criminalization of
various business and financial transactions, the imposition of
new due diligence measures on the private sector and the
concomitant weakening of privacy and confidentiality laws,
strengthened penalties for non-compliance with regulatory efforts,
and new law enforcement techniques, such as undercover sting
operations, wiretapping, expanded powers to search homes and
businesses, and controlled deliveries. So obtrusive are many of
the law enforcement techniques and the privatization of law
enforcement, whereby governments transfer their responsibilities
to the private sector, that many professionals engaged in
international transfer of wealth counseling analogized the trends
to those in Aldous Huxley's A Brave New World (or perhaps the
Steve Miller Band's rendition).
This discussion outlines the trends in six areas and draws
some practice pointers from the trends. Section II will discuss the
activities of international organizations that are driving much of
the strategy,. framework, and minimum standards for the
development of an international anti-money laundering regime.
Increasingly, international organizations, both of a universal and

a more regional level, are consciously trying to build alliances and
networks with each other and the private sector.
In Section III, selective elements of the substantive law of
anti-money laundering are considered in the context of recent
developments, such as the continued erosion of secrecy and the
imposition of increased due diligence requirements. Section IV
discusses major case and miscellaneous developments, such as
the failure of Russian offshore banks in Antigua.
Section V highlights the growth of international tax
enforcement, the increased reporting requirements and unilateral
extraterritorial application of the law, the increasing bilateral and
multilateral cooperation, and the new traps for the wary due to
tax enforcement developments.
In Section VI, international asset forfeiture trends are
highlighted. These activities pose a much graver threat to the
ability of clients to do business internationally than ten years ago.
The goal of immobilizing the assets of transnational criminals has
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become increasingly the watchword. While the rights of innocent
third parties are protected in principle, it sometimes takes a lot of
money and professional acumen for such persons to obtain due
process.
Section VII focuses on criminal cooperation mechanisms.
Section VIII discusses the use of international human rights
provisions as a shield for defendants, fiduciaries, and
intermediaries in the context of international anti-money
laundering and financial crime cases.
As an introductory matter, the life cycle of money laundering
is important to grasp. It has three cycles: (1) placement, whereby
the criminal has enormous amounts of dirty money in the form
usually of cash that he needs to place or initiate in a way that
neither law enforcement nor the private sector will identify as the
proceeds of crime; (2) layering, which involves the creation of
many layers between the dirty money and the ultimately cleaned
money through the use of offshore vehicles, such as trusts in
secrecy jurisdictions, in tandem with multiple, entities, such as
companies, and secrecy mechanisms, such as nominees, stamen,
bearer shares, and sophisticated structuring; and (3) integration
is achieved when the criminal has transformed the dirty money
through enough layers of the laundering cycle that a legitimate
banker, lawyer, or fiduciary, even one with cutting edge due
diligence, would never suspect the criminal source of the money.'
Integration means that, in 1999, the money of the many heirs of
Joseph Kennedy, the famous former bootlegger during the
prohibition days, now is not questioned. Indeed, the money even
finances federal elections (e.g., of the U.S. President, Senate, and
House). In Colombia, the money of the Call cartel has been
integrated for two or three decades into the leading
pharmaceutical companies, soccer teams, and also the financing
of political elections (e.g., the United States imposed sanctions
due to the financing of Samper's election).
Much of the emphasis of the politics of international antimoney laundering is to try to deprive criminals-especially
transnational criminals-and organized crime of the fruits of the
crimes and the means of their committing more crimes. Another
goal is to allocate the seized proceeds to governments and law
enforcement. Hence, the economics and politics of anti-money
laundering are to redistribute economics and power of crime. To
help with the fight, governments and international organizations
have solicited the collaboration of the private sector to prevent

1.
For background on cycles of money laundering, see Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Money Laundering: A Banker's Guide to Avoiding
Problems 3 (1993), available at <http://www.occ.trans.gov/launder/origl.htm>.
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money laundering through know-your-customer and identifying
and reporting to law enforcement suspicious transactions.
II. DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Multilateral organizations have set the framework for antimoney laundering standards, mechanisms, and institutions. 2 The
United Nations pioneered the 1988 Vienna Convention Against
the Trafficking in Illegal Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances,
which contains the requirements to criminalize money laundering
and immobilize the assets of persons involved in illegal narcotics
3
trafficking.
In 1989, the G-7 Economic Summit Group established the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which operates out of the
Office of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
headquarters in Paris. 4
FATF has issued a set of forty
recommendations (Forty Recommendations) that concern legal
requirements, financial and banking controls, and external
affairs.5 FATF operates through a Caribbean FATF (CFATF)6 and
is in the process of establishing a similar group in Asia. It issues
an annual report that provides an overview of progress and
problems in international anti-money laundering.7
The G-10 Basle Group of Central Banks has actively provided
guidelines for central bank supervisors and regulatory controls. 8
As mentioned below, on September 23, 1997, the Basle Group
issued guidelines on supervision. 9
Regionally, the Council of Europe's 1991 Convention on
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of Assets has
become the major international convention that obligates

2.

For background on the role of the international organizations, see

Bruce Zagaris & Sheila M. Castilla, Constructing an International Financial
Enforcement Subregime: The Implementation of Anti-Money-Laundering Policy, 29
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 872, 882-907 (1993).

3.
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Conference for the Adoption of a Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 6th plen.
mtg. at 182-84, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/15 (1988).
4.
For information about FATF, see http://www.oecd.org/fatf/about.htm
(last modified Aug. 5, 1999).
5.
40 FATF Recommendations, available in original form at
<http://www.oecd.org/fatf/about.htm>.
6.
See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, ANNUAL REPORT
1996-1997, at 24 [hereinafter FATF ANNUAL REPORT 1996-1997], available in
originalform at <http://www.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/97ar-en.pdf>.
7.
See FATFReports <http://www/oecd.org/fatf/reports.htm>.
8.
See infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
9.
See id.
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signatory
governments
to
cooperate against
anti-money
10
laundering from all serious crimes.
The European Union, as a signatory to the 1988 Vienna Drug
Convention and due to its own actions to combat financial crimes
against the Communities, issued a 1991 Anti-Money Laundering
Directive that it is poised to strengthen. 1 As mentioned below, it
is now in the process of an initiative against cybercrimes. 12
An important regional organization in the anti-money
laundering has been the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission (CICAD). At its meeting on November 4-7, 1997,
CICAD anti-money laundering experts recommended an ongoing
assessment of compliance with standards and the creation of
national financial intelligence units (FIUs).' 3
National
governments and international organizations are striving to create
mechanisms to monitor regularly compliance with international
standards.
Because the recent FATF annual reports and topologies
provide cutting-edge discussions of the status of money
laundering trends, they are discussed next.
A. FATF 1997 Annual Report
In June 1997, the Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering issued its annual report for 1996-97.14 The report
highlighted the annual survey of money laundering methods and
countermeasures covering a global overview of trends and
techniques.' 5
These methods included the increased use by
money launderers of non-bank financial institutions, especially
bureaux de change, remittance businesses and non-financial
professionals.' 6
Special attention was devoted to the money
17
laundering threats of new payment technologies.
The work of the FATF in 1996-97 focused on three main
areas:
"(i)
reviewing money
laundering methods
and
countermeasures; (ii) monitoring the implementation of antimoney laundering measures by its members; and (iii) undertaking

10.
See generally Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, Europ. T.S. No. 141.
11.
See Council Directive 91/308, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77-82.
12.
See infra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
13.

and

See generally Meeting of the Group of Experts to Control Money

Laundering,
October
28-30,
1997:
Final
Report,
OEA/Ser.L/XIV.4
(CICAD/LAVEX/doc. 12/97) (Oct. 30, 1997) [hereinafter Final Report, 1997].
14.
FATF ANNUAL REPORT 1996-1997, supra note 6, at 1.
15.
See id. at 4.

16.

See id.

17.

See id.
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an external relations program[ I to promote the widest possible
international action against money laundering."18
1. Reviewing Money Laundering Methods and Countermeasures
A significant achievement of FATF during 1996-97 was the
annual
survey
of
money
laundering
methods
and
countermeasures. 1 9 The survey provides a global overview of
trends and techniques, especially the issue of money laundering
through new payment technologies, such as smart cards and
banking through the Internet.2 0 FATF reviewed the issue of
electronic fund transfers and examined ways to improve the
appropriate level of feedback that should be provided to reporting
21
financial institutions.
a. Trends in FATF Members
While drug trafficking remains the single largest source of
illegal proceeds, non-drug related crime is increasingly
important. 2 2
The most noticeable trend is the continuing
increase in the use by money launderers of non-bank financial
institutions and of non-financial businesses relative to banking
institutions. The trend reflects the increased level of compliance
by banks with anti-money laundering measures. The survey

noted, "Outside the banking sector, the use of bureaux de change
or money remittance businesses remains the most frequently
23
cited threat."
FATF members have continued to expand their money
laundering laws, covering non-drug related predicate offenses,
improving confiscation laws, and expanding the application of
their laws in the financial sector in order to apply preventive
measures to non-bank financial institutions and non-financial
24
businesses.
FATF discussed money laundering threats that may be
inherent in the new e-money technologies, of which there are
three categories:
stored value cards, Internet/network based
systems, and hybrid systems.2 5
Important features of the
systems that will affect this threat are: (1) the value limits

18.
19,
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 6.
See id. at 7.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 8.
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imposed on accounts and transactions; (2) the extent to which
stored value cards become inoperable with Internet-based
systems; (3) the possibility that stored value cards can transfer
value between individuals; (4) the consistency of intermediaries in
the new payment systems; and (5) the detail in which account
26
and transaction records are kept.
Future issues include the need to review regulatory regimes,
the availability of adequate records, and "the difficulties in
detecting and in tracking or identifying unusual patterns of
financial transactions." 2 7
Since the application of new
technologies to electronic payment systems is still in its infancy,
law enforcement and regulators must continue to cooperate with
the private sector. 28 Then authorities may understand the issues

that must be considered and addressed as the market and
technologies mature.
b. Policy Issues
Electronic Fund Transfers. As a result of difficulties in tracing
illicit funds routed through the international funds transfer
system, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications (SWIFT) board "issued a broadcast to its
members and participating banks encouraging users to include
full identifying information for originators and beneficiaries in
2 9
SWIFT field tags 50 (Ordering Customer) and 59 (Beneficiary)."
Many countries have acted to encourage compliance within their
30
financial communities with the SWIFT broadcast message.
To strengthen the body of information on identifying the true
originating parties in transfers, SWIFT has devised a new optional
format (MT103) for implementation after November 1997.31 The
message format will have a new optional message field for
inputting all data "relating to the identification of the sender and
receiver (beneficiary) of the telegraphic transfer."3 2 Additionally,
"SWIFT has issued guidance to users of its current system to
describe where such information may appear in the MT 100
format."3 3 FATF has helped SWIFT devise the new mechanism
34
and is encouraging the use of the new message format.

26.

See id. at 8.

27.
28.
29.

Id.
See id.
Id.

30.
31.

See id.
See id.

32.

Id. at 8-9.

33.

Id. at 9.

34.

See id. at 8-9.
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Providing Feedback to
Financial Institutions. FATF
recommends that at least the recipient of a suspicious
transactions report should acknowledge receipt thereof.3 5 If the
report is then subject to a fuller investigation, the institution
could be advised of either the agency that is going to investigate
the report or the name of a contact officer. If a case is closed or
completed, the sending institution should receive timely
information on the decision or result.
Further cooperative
exchange of information and ideas is required for the partnership
between units that receive suspicious transaction reports, general
law enforcement, and the financial sector to work more
36
effectively.
Estimate of Magnitude of Money Laundering. Because of
insufficient data, FATF has created an ad hoc group that "will
consider the available statistical information and other
information concerning the proceeds of crime and money
laundering."3 7 This ad hoc group will also "defme the parameters
of a study on the magnitude of money laundering and agree on a
38
methodology and a timetable for the study."
2. Monitoring the Implementation of Anti-Money Laundering
Measures
As part of FATF's work, its members have pledged to monitor
the implementation of its Forty Recommendations through a twopronged approach consisting of (1) "an annual self-assessment
exercise," and (2) "more detailed mutual evaluation process under
which each member is subject to an onsite examination."3 9
As a result of Turkey's failure to implement FATF's
recommendations, FATF issued a public statement, in accordance
with Recommendation 21, that Turkey, a member country, was
40
insufficiently in compliance with the Forty Recommendations.
Recommendation 21 states that "[flinancial institutions should
give special attention to business relations and transactions with
persons, including companies and financial institutions, from
countries that do not or insufficiently apply" the Forty
Recommendations. 4 1 On November 19, 1996, Turkey enacted
Law no. 4208 on the Prevention of Money Laundering. 4 2 As a

35.
36.
37.

See id. at 9.
See id.
Id.

38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 10.

40.
41.
42.

Seeid. at lO-11.
Id.at 11 n.7.
Seeid. at 11.
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result, FATF decided to lift the application of Recommendation
21.

In 1995, after completing its first round of mutual
evaluations of whether all members had adequately implemented
the Forty Recommendations, a second round of mutual
evaluations was conducted. 4 4 The second round focused on the
effectiveness of members' anti-money launderig measures in
practice. Mutual evaluations of Australia, the United Kingdom,
Denmark, the United States, Austria, and Belgium occurred in
4
1996-97. 5
Asset Confiscation and Provisional Measures. The FATF
Secretariat conducted a study evaluating members' confiscation
measures and found that an effective confiscation mechanism
should encompass a range of serious offenses and should act
in appropriate cases to confiscate proceeds of crime where it is held
in the name of third parties. Countries should also consider
widening confiscation laws to permit confiscation without
conviction in certain cases, or the more limited alternative of
freezing, and where possible, confiscation action against
46
absconders and fugitives from justice.

For most members, the crucial issue was the burden of proof
upon the government and whether it can be eased or reversed. 4 7
Countries have enacted or considered the following measures:
aapplying an easier standard of proof than the normal criminal
standard; reversing the burden of proof and requiring the
defendant to prove that his assets are legitimately acquired; and
enabling courts to confiscate the proceeds of criminal activity
other than the crimes of which the defendant is immediately
Further options are to provide the court with
convicted." 48
discretion to confiscate a convicted drug trafficker's assets or to
that are
require the court to order the confiscation of all assets
49
disproportionate to the person's legitimate income.
Mutual legal assistance problems include instances arising
from questionable members that have ratified the relevant
international conventions or do not have the necessary domestic
Relatively limited mutual assistance
legislation in effect.5 0
experience exists among members in the confiscation field, and

43.
44.

See id.
See id.

45.

See id. at 12-19 (setting forth the results of each nation's evaluation).

46.

Id. at 20.

47.
48.
49.
50.

See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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confiscation

Customer Identification. Because of the comparatively weaker

regimes for customer identification in non-bank financial
institutions and bureaux de change, these institutions have
5
become more attractive routes for money launderers. '
Refinements are required for overseas and nominee accounts. In
addition, refinements are required for the structuring of large
non-financial business intermediaries and situations in which no
face-to-face contact between the customer and the financial
institution exists. The issue of customer identification arises in
transactions and
the context of rapid development of electronic
52
financial services through new technologies.
3. External Relations
In external relations, FATF encourages countries to adopt
and implement the FATF Recommendations and monitors and
reinforces this process. 5 3 FATF also cooperates and coordinates
with all the international and regional organizations concerned
with counter-money laundering measures.5 4 Finally, it pursues a
flexible approach, "tailoring external relations activity to the
circumstances of the region or countries involved." 5 5
FATF will embark upon more initiatives to encourage the
adoption and implementation of the Forty Recommendations.
FATF is working to develop a long-term strategic plan in
collaboration with other relevant international organizations.5 6
In 1996, FATF adopted both a policy and rules for "assessing
the implementation of anti-money laundering measures in nonThe development of a mutual
member governments."5 7
countries and
should encourage
evaluation procedure
jurisdictions not only to develop anti-money laundering laws, but
also to improve countermeasures already in existence. Hence,
FATF has worked with other international organizations such as
CFATF, the Council of Europe, and the Offshore Group of
Banking Supervisors (OGBS) to develop countermeasures.5 8

51.

See id. at 21.

52.

See id.

53.

See id. at 22.

54.

See id.

55,
.
56.
To provide wider and easier access to the Recommendations, FATF has
created a website at http://www.oecd.org/fatf.
57.
58.

FATF ANNUAL REPORT 1996-1997, supranote 6, at 23.
See id.
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In 1996 and 1997, important counter-money laundering

developments included the establishment of the Asia/Pacific
Group on Money Laundering and the Southern and Eastern
African Money Laundering Conference. 5 9 FATF has supported
existing bodies rather than starting new initiatives. The new
global project of the U.N. Drug Control Programme/U.N. Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice Division (UNDCP/UNCPCJD) on
these measures through
money laundering will help implement
60
training and technical assistance.
In the Caribbean, FATF supported the endorsement of the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) at the 1996 Ministerial
meeting of the CFATF. 6 1 CFATF finalized mutual evaluation
reports of the Cayman Islands and Trinidad & Tobago, and
planned six evaluation visits for 1997.62 CFATF also started its
typologies exercise, whereby it will "develop and share among its
members the latest intelligence on money laundering and other
techniques used in the Caribbean region and
financial crime
63
elsewhere."
In April 1997, the Finance Ministers of the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) issued a ministerial statement
welcoming the establishment of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money
Laundering. 6 4 FATF stated that the endeavor required urgent
and those of the Asia/Pacific Group
funding from FATF members
65
on Money Laundering.
Finally, from October 1-3, 1996, representatives of thirteen
African countries attended a conference on anti-money
a Southern and
laundering and agreed on a proposal to establish
66
Eastern African Financial Action Task Force.
B. FATF 1998 Annual Report
In June 1998, the Financial Action Task Force on Money

Laundering released its annual report for 1997-98.67 The ninth
round of FATF was chaired by Belgium and was marked by the
elaboration of a five year plan for 1999-2004, highlighted by a
decision to broaden the FATF network and the scope of its work,

59.
60.

See id.
See id.

61.
62.
63.
64.

See id.at 24.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 25.

65.

See id.

See id.
66.
FINANCIAL ACION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING (FATF), ANNUAL REPORT
67.
1997-1998, availablein originalform at <http://www.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/98ar-en.pdf>.
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and to strengthen the review of money laundering trends and
68
countermeasures.
1. Trends and Future Mission of FATF
The most noticeable trend is the continuing increase in the
use by money launderers of non-bank financial institutions and
of non-financial businesses relative to banking institutions. The
trend reflects the increased level of compliance by banks with
anti-money laundering measures. Outside the banking sector,
the use of bureaux de change or money remittance businesses
remain the most frequently cited.
In 1994, five years after the 1989 G-7 Summit established
FATF, its members decided that the Task Force-which is not a
permanent international organization-should continue its work
for a further five years until 1999. Moreover, it was agreed in
1994 that no final decision on the future of FATF would be taken
until 1997-98.69
By mid-1999, it is expected that every FATF member will
have experienced two evaluations of their anti-money laundering
systems. 70 While the first round of evaluations dealt with the issue of whether all members had adequately implemented the
Forty Recommendations, the second round concerns the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering system in each member
country. 7 '
FATF organized "missions and seminars in nonmember countries to promote awareness of the money laundering
problem" and encourage countermeasures. 7 2 Although FATF's
Forty Recommendations have gained some international recognition, a large number of countries still have not implemented antimoney laundering systems. 7 3
FATF has succeeded in achieving an international consensus

on the money laundering countermeasures, in persuading many
countries to implement the measures, and in establishing a
"network" of money laundering experts in each of the FATF
members. 7 4 FATF has improved the flow of information both at
the domestic level and internationally. 75
The first major task in the future that the report outlined is
"[t]o establish a world-wide anti-money laundering network and to

68.
69.

See id. at 4.
See id. at 7.

70.
71.
72.

See id.
See id.
Id.

73.

See id.

74.

Id.

75.

See id.
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spread the FATF's message to all continents and regions of the
globe."7 6
To accomplish the task, FATF will expand its
membership to "strategically important countries which already
have certain key anti-money laundering measures in place ...
[and] are politically determined to make a full commitment
towards the implementation of the [Florty Recommendations, and
which could play a major role in their regions in the process of
combating money laundering."7 7 FATF will also develop regional
bodies emulating FATF, and will cooperate closely with relevant
international organizations such as the U.N. bodies and the
78
International Financial Institutions.
The second major task will be to improve the implementation
of the Forty Recommendations in FATF members. The focus will
be to "ensure that all members have implemented the revised
[F]orty Recommendations in their entirety and in an effective
manner."79
Hence, the existing monitoring mechanisms will
receive a renewed assessment focusing on the 1996

Recommendations. This assessment will involve
[a]n enhanced self-assessment process; and a third round of
simplified mutual evaluations for all FATF members starting in
2001, focusing exclusively on compliance with the revised parts of
the Recommendations, the areas of significant deficiencies
identified in the second round, and generally the effectiveness of
80
the countermeasures.

The third main task will be to strengthen the review of money
laundering trends and countermeasures.8 1
Because money
laundering is an evolving activity, FATF members must follow
laundering trends and techniques and assess the effectiveness of
the FATF recommendations. The geographical scope of the future
typologies exercises must be extended. The close monitoring of
trends will enable FATF to anticipate and react to the trends by
8 2
elaborating countermeasures.
2. Monitoring the Implementation of Anti-Money Laundering
Measures
Much of FATF's work consists of monitoring the
implementation by its members of the Forty Recommendations.
FATF members are committed to the discipline of multilateral

76.

Id.

77.

Id. at 8.

78.
79.

See id.
Id.

80.

Id.

81.
82.

See id.
See id.
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surveillance and peer review.
Member countries have their
implementation of the recommendations monitored through a
two-pronged approach comprised of (1) "an annual selfassessment exercise," and (2) a "more mutual evaluation process
under which each member is subject to an on-site
83
examination."
The 1997-98 self-assessment process consisted of each
member providing information concerning the status of their
implementation of the Forty Recommendations. 8 4
The
information is then compiled and analyzed, providing the basis for
assessing to what extent the Forty Recommendations have been
implemented.
With respect to legal issues, all members have enacted laws
criminalizing drug money laundering.8 5
All but three FATF
members have criminalized laundering of the proceeds of range of
crimes in addition to drug trafficking.8 6 The report notes that
"[t]he overall level of compliance will improve considerably when
Japan, Luxembourg, and Singapore have extended their drug
money laundering offenses to serious crimes,"8 7 which all three
are in the process of doing.
"A number of members still must take measures in relation to
confiscation and provisional measures, both domestically and
pursuant to mutual legal assistance."8 8 In regard to domestic
confiscation, nineteen members are in full compliance, and six in
partial compliance.8 9 For mutual legal assistance, seventeen
members are in full compliance, five in partial compliance, and
three are out of compliance (Canada, Greece and the United
States).9 0 Urgent action by some FATF members is required to
bring
themselves
into
compliance
with
the
relevant
recommendations. 9 1
Slight improvement occurred in the 1997-98 implementation
of the FATF recommendations on financial issues. 9 2
Major
improvements occurred in relation to two new recommendations
that were introduced in 1996, namely Recommendation 13
dealing with the need to monitor laundering using new
93
technologies, and Recommendation 25 on shell corporations.

83.
84.

Id. at 9-10.
See id. at 10.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
See id. at 10.
See id.
See id.

92.

See id.

93.

See id.
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However,

non-bank

institutions

still

are

not

properly

implementing the recommendations at the same level as the
banking sector.
While nearly all FATF members "comply fully with customer
identification and record-keeping requirements for banks . . .
some persistent gaps in coverage with respect to certain
categories of non-bank financial institutions" still exist.9 4 Serious
concerns exist regarding the anonymous passbooks for residents
in Austria that FATF is pursuing through the FATF non95
compliance procedures.
The requirement for financial institutions to report
suspicious transactions and related measures has received "very
satisfactory" implementation in relation to banks and almost as
good for non-bank
financial
institutions. 9 6
However,
improvement is required with respect to non-bank financial
institutions, especially in countries such as Canada, Iceland, and
the United States.
The report also discusses the mutual evaluations of Canada,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Norway, Japan,
97
and Greece.
A section of the report concerning the application of the FATF
policy for non-complying members covers, inter alia, the failure of
Austria to abolish anonymous passbooks for Austria residents
and a series of concerns on Canadian countermeasures.9" The
proposed
Canadian
countermeasures
include
mandatory
suspicious transaction reporting, penalizing failures to file a

report and filing a false report, as well as a "tipping-off" offense,
the establishment of a new financial intelligence unit, protection
from criminal and civil liability for any person or body that makes
a report, and establishing a cross border reporting system for
currency and monetary instruments. 99
3. Reviewing Money Laundering Methods and Countermeasures
FATF performed a further survey of money laundering
methods and countermeasures that provides a global overview of
trends and techniques.' 0 0
The issues of money laundering
through new payments technologies-smart cards, banking
through the Internet-and of the non-financial businesses and

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 11.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 12-23.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 25-28.
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remittance companies were discussed.101
The survey also
considered the issues of how to "improve the appropriate level of
feedback which should be provided to reporting financial
institutions, and the continuation of work on estimating the
magnitude of money laundering."10 2 Moreover, FATF convened a
second meeting with representatives of the world's financial sector
trade institutions.
With respect to new technology-for example, e-cash-the
report concluded that much work remains before all the related
money' laundering dangers can be clearly identified and before
03
any possible specific countermeasures can be considered.'
FATF has also directed its attention toward money laundering in
sectors such as insurance or money changing.' 0 4 In connection
with the latter, consideration is given to the consequences of the
conversion of European currencies into the Euro.10 s
With respect to providing feedback to financial institutions,
the FATF guidelines are not mandatory because they recognize
"that ongoing law enforcement investigations should not be put at
risk, that secrecy laws in some countries may prevent their
financial intelligence unit from disclosing significant feedback,
and that general privacy laws can also limit feedback." 0 6 Hence,
the guidelines are designed to assist financial intelligence units,
law enforcement and other government bodies involved in the

receipt, analysis, and investigation of suspicious transaction
reports, and in the provision of feedback to reporting institutions
on those reports.' 0 7
The guidelines suggest that at least
regulatory authorities make available sanitized cases to reporting
institutions, and "each case could include a description of the
fact, a summary of the result, a description of the inquiries made
by the FIU if appropriate, and a description of the lessons to be
learn[ed] from the reporting and investigative procedures that
were adopted in the case."1 0 8
Additionally, new money
laundering methods, as well as trends in existing techniques, are
described and identified and the guidelines provide that
09
institutions are advised of such trends and techniques.'
The guidelines also consider means for providing general
feedback, such as "annual reports, regular newsletters, videos,

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See id. at 25.
Id.
See id. at 26.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See 1d.
Id.
See id.
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electronic information systems such as websites, electronic
databases or message systems, meetings with institutions,
conferences and workshops, and working or liaison groups."" 0
The report notes that specific feedback is more difficult to
provide than general feedback due to legal and practical concerns,
such as potential jeopardy to ongoing law enforcement
investigations and resource limitations, and secrecy laws relating
to the financial intelligence or general privacy laws."'
Still,
whenever
possible,
specific
feedback
should
include
acknowledgment by the FIU of receipt of the report and advice to
the institution that a particular agency will investigate the report
when this occurs and if the investigation would not be adversely
affected. 1 12 "[I]f a case is closed or completed, whether because of
a concluded prosecution, because the report was found to relate
to a legitimate transaction or for other reasons," the institution
l 3
should be notified of that decision or result."
4. FATF's External Relations and Other International Initiatives
As the third component of its mission, FATF undertakes
external relations actions designed to raise awareness in nonmember countries or regions on the need to prevent or combat
money laundering, and offers the Forty Recommendations as a
14
basis for doing so.1
In September 1997, FATF's external relations included a
mission to Cyprus, resulting in Cyprus undergoing a joint Council
of Europe/Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS) mutual
evaluation of Cyprus' money laundering system in the spring of
1998."1 In October 1997, FATF helped organize a conference in
St. Petersburg to complement a high-level mission to Moscow in
1996.116 Various new and proposed countermeasures are in
7
place and in the works in Russia."
FATF-style regional bodies are active. CFATF has grown to
twenty-four states and has instituted measures to ensure the
effective implementation of, and compliance with, the Forty
Recommendations. "1s

110.

Id. at 27.

111.

See id.

112.
113.

See id.
Id.

114.
115.

See id. at 28.
See id. at 29.

116.
117.
118.

See id.
See iU.
See id. at 30.
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The CFATF Secretariat monitors members' implementation of the
Kingston Ministerial Declaration through the following activities:
self-assessment of the implementation of the [R]ecommendations;
an on-going programme of mutual evaluation of members;
coordination of, and participation in, training and technical
assistance programs; biannual plenary meetings for technical
1 19
representatives; and annual Ministerial meetings.

The report notes that "[slupported by, and in collaboration
with UNDCP, the CFATF Secretariat has developed a regional
strategy for technical assistance and training to aid effective
investigation and prosecution of money laundering and related
asset forfeiture cases." 120 In 1997-98, three mutual evaluation
reports were discussed and six on-site visits occurred. A time12 1
table was set for the remaining mutual evaluations.
In July 1997, the Working Party meeting of the Asia/Pacific
Group on Money Laundering (APG) made progress. It currently
consists of sixteen members 122 that "have started to exchange
information and to examine the strengths and weaknesses of their
23
systems through the mechanism of jurisdiction reports."'
Measures have been proposed to improve technical assistance
and training, strengthen mutual legal assistance and improve
12 4
cooperation with the financial sector.
FATF adopted a policy for assessing the implementation of
anti-money laundering measures in non-member governments. 1S
The procedure will encourage countries and territories not only
to implement anti-money laundering measures, but also to
improve the countermeasures already in place. In this regard,
the FATF assessed the CFATF, the Council of Europe and the
OGBS's mutual evaluation procedures as being in conformity with
its own principles. As the latter is comprised of representatives of
banking supervisory authorities, the FATF has sought formal
political endorsement of the procedures and the forty
Recommendations from those governments of the members of the
OGBS that are not represented in either the CFATF or the
26
FATF.1

FATF cooperates with other international organizations. In
this regard, the U.N. Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
(UNODCCP) has started the Global Programme Against Money

119. Id. The Kingston
Recommendations.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 31.
123. Id. at 30.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 31.
126. Id.
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Laundering

(GPML),

a

research

and

technical

cooperation

program. In the context of the GPML, the UNODCCP organized
several important international anti-money laundering events in
1997-1998, including awareness-raising seminars for West Africa
in Ivory Coast, and for South Asian countries plus Myanmar and
Thailand. 127 On June 8-10, 1998, the U.N. General Assembly on
international narcotics trafficking adopted a political declaration
in which U.N. members undertake to make special efforts against
the laundering of money linked to drug trafficking.
The
declaration recommends that states that have not yet done so
adopt by the year 2003 national anti-money laundering legislation
and programs in accordance with relevant provisions of the 1988
Vienna Convention Against the Traffic in Illicit Narcotic and
Psychotropic Substances, and a package of countermeasures that
were adopted at the same session. 128
The Commonwealth Heads of Government recently has held
summits calling for concerted anti-money laundering actions. At
its June 1998 London meeting, it considered four main items:
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

improving
domestic
coordination
through
national
interdisciplinary coordinating structure;
the special problems of dealing with money laundering in
countries with large parallel economies;
strengthening regional initiatives for more effective
implementation of anti-money laundering measures; and

self-evaluation of progress made in implementing anti-money
laundering measures in the financial sector. 129

The Inter-American Development Bank has held meetings

and is starting to become involved in anti-money laundering
activities, such as training, supporting dialogue with the private
13 0

sector, and funding programs).
The Organization of American States (OAS)/Inter-American
Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) has a group of experts

that meets twice a year. In May 1998, it "approved a training
program

for judges,

prosecutors,

FIU personnel

and law

enforcement. It also undertook to amend the model regulations
to expand the predicate offence for money laundering and to
provide for the establishment of national forfeiture funds."1 31 It
finished a directory of contact points to effect information

exchange and mutual legal assistance that would be accessible
through OAS's webpage.13 2

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See id. at 32.
See d. at 32.
Id. at 33.
See d.
Id.
See id.
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5. Summary and Conclusion

The expansion of the FATF network and of the scope of its
countermeasures will mean that launderers will use their power
and know-how to try to take advantage of globalization and new
technology, and to identify and exploit jurisdictions whose
systems are vulnerable. For a five-year assessment, noticeably
absent in the discussion is the use of international relations and
particularly international-regime theory, including the rise and
fall of linkages that make regimes rise and fall, and the targeting
of key elements within such regimes. Additional limitations that
exacerbate the absence of this element of its strategic planning
are the temporal-its existence is limited to five years-and
informal commitments-FATF is still not a formal entity. Given
the threats arising from money laundering, one would think the
world community would make commitments commensurate with
the threats, but then progress in evolving international
enforcement regimes can be slow.
During 1996-97, progress was made in combating money
laundering, both within and outside the FATF membership.
Implementation of the Forty Recommendations by FATF has again
improved and the monitoring mechanisms have been further
strengthened and refined.
The international anti-money
laundering activities undertaken by FATF and other international
13 3
organizations have increased.
C. The Egmont GroupAgrees on HarmonizationMeasures and
CooperationAmong FinancialIntelligence Units
On June 23-24, 1997, the Egmont Group, composed of
specialists in financial investigation from thirty-six countries and

seven international organizations, including Interpol and Europol,
approved at its fifth meeting a declaration of principles to
harmonize policies and intensify its efforts in combating money
laundering.' 3 4 The Spanish Executive Service of the Commission
to Prevent Money Laundering and Financial Offenses (Servicio
Ejecutivo Espaflol de la Comisi6n de Prevenci6n del Blanqueo de
Capitales e Infracciones Monetarias, or Sepblac) organized the
meeting at the Bank of Spain.
Among the principles agreed upon were the following: (1) the
stimulation of exchanges among various FIUs; (2) the adoption of

133.
See id. at 34.
134. For background, see Carlos Novo, Una Cumbre de Exportos Perfila en
Madrid EstrategiasContra El Blanqueo de Dinero [Experts Set Forth in Madrid AntiMoney Laundering Strategies], LA VANGUARDIA, July 18, 1997.
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a program of communication among FIUs through the Internet;
(3) the holding and development of regional workshops or
seminars for their members and their units and sub-units; and
(4) the study of a formal structure to maintain the continuation
and consolidation of the Egmont group and the articulation of
135
procedures for FIUs and their counterparts.
The Egmont Group was established on June 9, 1995, at the
palace of Egmont-Arenberg in Brussels as a result of an
international movement directed at the promulgation in all
countries of a norm pertaining to the prevention of money
laundering and the establishment in each state of an organization
to fulfill the obligations imposed on FIUs. The Egmont Group
does not constitute an international organization or set forth hard
law obligations under an international agreement, but rather
provides an informal means for interested entities to meet and
cooperate voluntarily.
The conclusions of the meeting indicate that Spanish norms
on preventing money laundering and collaboration among credit
entities, banks, and savings and loan associations, have gained
momentum. Sepblac took action during 1989 on 1,530 cases on
various fronts.' 3 6 In the matter of international business
transactions, Sepblac verified the fulfillment of requirements of
enterprises owned by foreign shareholders.
In so doing, it
discovered the manipulation in the formation of stock exchange
prices. Furthermore, Sepblac observed foreign loans that hide
increases of capital in Spanish affiliate enterprises abroad.' 3 7

In the matter of money laundering, Seplac transmitted and
finalized 412 cases in 1998, 58 of which were referred to the antidrug prosecutor, 54 to the special anti-corruption prosecutor, 10
to different judicial authorities, and 43 to police authorities.138
The remaining cases were shelved without further investigation or
prosecution. Sepblac also investigated, among other activities,
suspicious dealings in sectors such as jewelry and precious
metals, the importation of vehicles, contraband tobacco, hotel
businesses, the industry of information technology and products,
13 9
value added tax fraud, and casinos.
The work of the Egmont Group and Sepblac indicate the
emergence and coalescence of a financial enforcement regime, of
which money laundering is an important component.
The
cooperation within the Egmont Group exemplifies the role of
informal cooperation and its impact on the formation and growth

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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of national enforcement activities. The achievement of a financial
enforcement regime has occurred within the goals and activities of
both formal organizations and obligations-such as the U.N. Drug
Programme, the 1988 U.N. Vienna Convention Against the Traffic
in Illicit Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances and the European
Union, and the 1991 EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive-and
informal organizations and undertakings-such as FATF and its
Forty Recommendations, and the Caribbean FATF and its
additional recommendations.
D. G-8 Group Agree on CooperationAgainst Cybercrimes
On December 10, 1997, at a meeting in Washington, D.C.,
ministers from eight industrialized governments agreed to combat
cybercrime with enhanced technology and a harmonized crime
legislation. 140
The arrangements to cooperate against cybercrime result
from the ongoing discussions among the G-7 nations, that is, the
G-7 Economic Summit countries-plus the European Union and
Russia. In particular, the governments agreed to cooperate in
investigations
and
enforcement
actions
involving
cyber
criminals.

14 1

The G-8 countries agreed on a series of principles, such as
denying a safe haven to abusers of information technology. 142
Just as important will be the establishment of a network and
contacts to assist in investigating and arresting perpetrators of
cybercrimes, including computer hackers, online peddlers of child

pornography, drug traffickers, organized crime, and people who
use computer networks to perpetrate illicit activities. 14
The ministers agreed on the following steps:
(1)
(2)

ensuring that law enforcement is properly staffed
and trained to fight cybercrime;
developing improved means to quickly trace
attacks coming through computer networks;
allocating the same time and resources to the
prosecution of cybercriminals who have attacked
other countries as would be allocated for
domestic attacks, if extradition is not possible
due to nationality;

140. See 'The Eight" Agree to Attack Cyber Crime Through Tough Laws,
Technology, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Dec. 11, 1997, at A-12.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. In the future, "the ministers will revisit their cyber crime agenda after a
group of experts makes recommendations on the matter." Id. A time-table has
not yet been set for the report.

1999]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS INANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 1047

(3)

ensuring the preservation of electronic evidence

(4)

(5)
(6)

(7)

(8)
(9)

and developing
solutions for transborder
searches and computer searches involving data
whose location is not known to officials;
cooperating with the private sector to develop
new solutions for preserving and collecting
critical evidence;
accelerating the process by which traffic data
from communications carriers can be obtained;
ensuring expeditious responses to mutual
assistance requests, in appropriate cases, by
voice, fax, or e-mail communications followed by
written confir-mation, if needed;
encouraging. the development of international
standards
for
reliable
and
secure
telecommunications
and
data
processing
technologies;
using compatible forensic standards to retrieve
and authenticate electronic data; and
including cybercrime issues when negotiating
mutual
assistance
agreements
or
arrangements. 144

A 1996 survey of the Computer Security Institute revealed
that forty-two percent of Fortune 500 companies had experienced
an unauthorized use of their computer systems during the last
14 5
year.
While U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno has said that the
action plan does not require new legislation by the United States,
wiretap laws must be adjusted to accommodate the digital era. 14 6
All ministers promised to review their legal systems, "to ensure
that
[their
laws]
appropriately
criminalize
abuses
of
telecommunications and computer systems and promote the
investigation of high crimes." 147
During the week of the meeting, the vulnerability of the
Internet to such crimes was emphasized when hackers broke into
computers at Yahool, one of the most popular sites on the World

Wide Web, and threatened to infect users' computers with a
damaging computer virus unless an alleged hacker was released
48
from jafl.1

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. (quoting U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno).
See id.
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Many cybercrimes involve fraudulent pyramid schemes
distributed by electronic mail. 14 9 Another fraud includes tricking
Internet users into relinquishing passwords that can be used to
access their accounts. 15 0 The G-8 agreement is an effort by
national governments to enable international criminal cooperation
developments to keep pace with technology and its use by
transnational criminals.
E. G-1O Basle Committee Issues FinalGuide on Supervision

On September 23, 1997, the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision, the central bank organ of the G-10 countries, agreed
on a final version of supervision principles to strengthen the
supervisory regime.' 5 ' While the new guide contains no
substantive changes, the text has gained support. For example,
52
delegates attending the Denver Summit endorsed it.1
The Committee also obtained comments from many countries
outside the group, including Chile, China, the Czech Republic,
Hong Kong, Mexico, Russia, and Thailand. In addition, bankers
and banking regulators from Argentina, Brazil, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Poland, and Singapore
53
contributed to the summit.'
Major financial countries have been asked to endorse the two
principles by no later than October 1998. The principles "outline
the basic elements of a banking supervisory system including
licensing and structure, prudential regulations and requirements,
methods
of
ongoing
banking
supervision,
information
requirements, the formal powers of supervisors and cross-border
banking." 15 4 A compendium of laws accompanies the regulations
that banks are requested to update on a regular basis.15 5
The Basle Core Principles aim to provide a basic reference
with which supervisory and other public authorities worldwide
may supervise all of the banks within their jurisdictions. Central
banks that endorse the principles will review and update their
own current supervisory arrangements in accordance with the
principles.

149. See Mark Suzman & Louise Kehoe, G7 in Push to Combat Cybercrime,
FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 11, 1997, at 5.
150. See id.
151. For background, see Final Guide on Supervision Principles Issued in
Geneva by Basle Commission, DAILY REP. FOR Ex'CUTIVES, Sept. 23, 1997, at A-2.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. See id.
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The Committee urged national legislators to ensure that
required changes in the law be enacted quickly. Since the
measures outlined in the principles took one and a half years to
coordinate, and since they are minimum requirements, the
Committee observes that many countries may want to tighten
their own rules further than the principles require.1 s 6
The
Committee pledged technical assistance and training for
regulatory agencies from non-G-10 countries that want to take
15 7
advantage of the principles.
The continued review and strengthening of global and
domestic financial supervisory mechanisms has become more
urgent in a globalized world in which transnational crime and
organized groups operate. Increasingly, international organizations and groups, such as the Basle Committee, the FATF, the
World Bank Group, and Interpol, are exchanging information and
cooperating among themselves to complement their regulatory
and enforcement frameworks.
F. European Union Takes InitiativeAgainst Cybercrimes
On April 24, 1997, members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) proposed to enact legislation against certain cybercrimes,
namely pornography, paedophilia, and racist material.' 5 8 The
measures will include establishing teams of cyberpolice to
monitor the Internet, requiring industry self-regulation, and
concluding international enforcement cooperation agreements.

The European Union also scheduled for July 6-8, 1997 a
ministerial conference on global information networks that was
59
intended to lead to a declaration on regulatory principles.1
The MEPs will try to strike a balance between protecting the
public from obscenity and respecting an individual's right to free
speech and privacy. The United States, Germany and France
have regulated the Internet, but with limited success. 160 The
French and German authorities have focused on Internet service
providers. For instance, Karlheinz Moewes, the chief officer of the
Munich police, heads the first German force to combat Internet
crime. His team of five Internet police investigated 110 cases of
child pornography worldwide in 1996.161 They patrol the Internet

156.

See id.

157.
See id.
158.
See Sandra Smith, EU Takes Lead on Internet Porn, EUROPEAN, May 1,
1997, at 2.
159.
See id.
160.
See id.
161.
See id.
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on a regular basis, searching for child pornography and trying to
follow and penetrate groups of paedophiles.
In Belgium and the United Kingdom, similar law enforcement
groups operate. For instance, in the United Kingdom the teams
cooperate with the Internet Service Providers Association, which
blocks access if illegal sites are discovered. 16 2 The difficulty is
that the persons responsible for perpetrating the crimes may be
outside the European Union and in remote parts of the world
where law enforcement cooperation is not effective.
MEPs have called on the European Commission to propose a
common framework for self-regulation and to agree on a code of
good
behavior. 163
According
to
EU
Industrial
Affairs
Commissioner Martin Bangemann, the EU must introduce
binding measures on service providers, with penalties. 16 4 MEPs
believe that service providers must be liable for illicit material on
165
their systems.
In April 1997, German authorities charged the managing
director of CompuServe in Bavaria with providing access to
pornographic and racist material. 16 6 The situation is seen as a
test case. Service providers contend that they should be treated
like telecommunications companies, who are not prosecuted
16 7
when criminals use their lines.
French MEP Pierre Pradier wants to make users responsible
because families can use software devices to screen criminal and
68
harmful material.'
One problem is the classic issue of whether the law can keep
up with the technology. Undoubtedly, the European Union and
other major powers will need to update their laws constantly.
Meanwhile, criminal organizations are likely to search for,
identify, and utilize the states that intentionally or accidentally
have the lowest law and regulatory regime.
G. CICAD Experts Recommend On-GoingAssessment
of Compliance uith Standardsand Creationof
NationalFinancialIntelligence Units
At its meeting on November 4-7, 1997 in Lima, Peru, CICAD,
several
decisions
and
a branch
of the
OAS, made
recommendations of importance to international enforcement,

162.
163.
164.

See id.
See id.
See id.

165.
166.
167.
168.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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including steps to undertake an ongoing assessment of money
laundering in the hemisphere, the creation of national FIUs, and
measures to strengthen the training of officials and the exchange
1 69
of information and reciprocal judicial assistance.
1. Creation of Financial Intelligence Units
The CLAD recommended to CICAD the amendment of the
Model Regulations as follows:
In accordance with the law, each member state shall establish or
designate a central agency responsible for receiving, requesting,
analyzing and disseminating to the competent authorities,
disclosures of information relating to financial transactions that are
required to be reported pursuant to these Model Regulations or
170
that concern suspected proceeds of crime.

The recommendation explains that the objective is to receive
and analyze information so that it can be utilized by the
competent authorities. 17 1
The entities can be referred to
variously as Financial Intelligence Units, Financial Investigation
172
Units, Financial Information Units, or Financial Analysis Units.

Depending on its location in the governmental structure of a
country, FIUs may assume one of the following modes as
identified by .he Egmont Group: a police model; a judicial model;
17 3
a mixed police and judicial model; or an administrative model.
2. Ongoing Assessment of the Plan of Action of Buenos Aires
After discussing the results of responses to a questionnaire
on the status of anti-money laundering regulations in twenty-one
CICAD countries, the CICAD Group of Experts determined that
the top two priority areas on which to focus their efforts for the
immediate future would be (1) the training of officials, and (2)
strengthening the exchange of information and reciprocal judicial
7 4
assistance.1
Training should focus on officials who work in FIUs or in
other entities-whose purpose is to receive and analyze information, investigate on the basis thereof, or both-transactions that
appear to involve money laundering. 175 Training also is required
for investigators on the applicable investigation methods and

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See generallyFinal Report, 1997, supranote 13.
Id. at 4-5.
See id. at 4-5.
See iid. at 5.
See id.
See id. at 6-8.
See id. at 7.
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techniques for money laundering offenses and on methods of presenting evidence regarding money laundering before the courts or
other competent entities.
Moreover, training is required for prosecutors and judges to
ensure full understanding of the offense, the importance of
stringent conviction and prosecution, evidence in money
laundering cases, international cooperation among judges for
mutual legal assistance purposes (especially in exchanging the
probative elements of the offense), the importance of seizure,
confiscation pending trial, ultimate forfeiture of laundered assets
and instrumentalities, and the difficulties in securing convictions.
Training also is required for officials of supervisory and
regulatory agencies responsible for overseeing financial
institutions. In this connection, training should be focused on the
development and application of the appropriate control systems
over financial institutions. It should also include training with
respect to reporting systems for required cash and suspicious
transaction reports, on the authority and law under which the
agency operates, and on comparative approaches in other
countries.
The Group of Experts will organize an informal working group
for the purpose of identifying a training program based on the
priority areas identified in the Group's discussion and the replies
to the questionnaire.

17 6

The Group discussed the difficulties in investigating and
proving money laundering, especially due to its transnational
nature that complicates, in particular, investigation and issues of
proof.177 These aspects require a high level of international
cooperation, formal and informal, that must be efficient and
effective. There must exist a reciprocal capability to seize and
freeze assets as well as to provide for their confiscation when they
are situated in a country other than where the investigation and
trial are occurring.
The Group noted the importance of studies to facilitate the
compilation, systematization, and diffusion of information on
applicable national and international norms to identify the
appropriate central authorities to give effect to the intended
178
cooperation.
For their next meeting, the Group of Experts agreed to
consider the applicability of developing a manual on these
matters that would set out the applicable laws and contact points

176.
177.
178.

See id. at 6.
See id.
See id. at 7.
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179
The
in the various administrations in CICAD member states.
Executive Secretariat will develop a model outline for such a
manual for the next meeting of the Group. To assist in this work,
CICAD members will provide an explanatory report on these
measures and identify the competent authorities.
The Group of Experts agreed that a typologies exercise will
80
For the next meeting
become part of their ongoing agenda.'
basis, a report on
a
voluntary
on
prepare,
would
countries
certain
typologies.
laundering
money
their experience in detecting

3. Amendments to Model Regulations, Manual, and Mutual
Evaluations
On May 12-14, 1998, the OAS-CICAD met and agreed to
18 1
This
strengthen anti-money laundering enforcement efforts.
section outlines the Commission's initiatives.
a. Training
The Group approved a training plan based on modules for the
training of judges, prosecutors, FIU personnel, and law
enforcement officials. Wherever possible, the training plan would
be implemented on a sub-regional basis, following a needs
assessment and diagnosis to determine the priorities of each
country or region.
b. Amendments to the Model Regulations
To bring the model regulations approved in May 1992 in line
with the broad international policy guidelines, especially those
contained in the Summit of the Americas Plan of Action of Buenos
Aires of 1995, the model regulations will incorporate the concept
of "serious offenses," so that anti-money laundering laws and
regulations are designed to counteract serious crimes rather than
just drug violations.' 8 2 As a result, the title of the regulations
was modified to read Model Regulations Concerning Laundering
Offenses Connected to Illicit Drug Trafficking, Related and Other
Serious Offenses. As defined, "serious offenses" means "those
defined by the legislation of each country, including, for example

179.
180.

See id. at 8.
See id. at 7.

181.

See Meeting of the Group of Experts to Control Money Laundering,

OEA/Ser.L/XIV.4 (CICAD/LAVEX/doc.23/98) (May 14, 1998).
182.

See Meeting of the Group of Experts to Control Money Laundering,

October 26-30, 1998: Final Report, 4, OEA/Ser.L/XIV.2.24 (CICAD/doc.990/98,
rev. 1) (Nov. 10, 1998) [hereinafter FinalReport, 1998].
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illegal activities that relate to organized crime, terrorism, illicit
trafficking of arms, persons or body organs, corruption, fraud,
18 3
extortion and kidnapping."
Another change is that under new Article 7(d) CICAD
members will "facilitate the sharing of the objects of the forfeiture
or the proceeds from their sale, on a basis commensurate with
participation, with the country or countries that assisted or
participated in the investigation or legal proceedings that resulted
in the objects being forfeited." 184 In addition, new Article 7(f)
obligates members to "promote and facilitate the creation of a
national forfeiture fund to administer the objects of forfeiture and
to authorize their use or allocation to support programs for
judicial management [and] training," as well as for counterdrug
85
efforts and related programs.'
The group adopted a proposal by St. Lucia to amend Article
10, § 1(b) to broaden the definition of financial institutions to
include businesses authorized to conduct "offshore" financial
activities.' 8 6 The group deferred until the next meeting action on
proposals of St. Lucia to add collective investment funds, such as
mutual funds and unit trusts, to Article 9(2).
c. Manual on Information Exchange for Anti-Laundering and
Mutual Assistance
Consideration was given to the information page that could
become a valuable tool for all countries in facilitating points of
contact for information exchange and mutual legal assistance. 18 7
The pages would be accessible through CICAD's webpage and
would be kept current.
The United States discussed the operation of the Egmont
website system as an example of how secure information
exchanges are occurring among the FIU Egmont members.
Eventually, the CICAD system may be set up for secure
information exchange.

183. INTER-AMERICAN DRUG ABUSE CONTROL COMMISSION (CICAD), MODEL
REGULATIONS CONCERNING LAUNDERING OFFENSES CONNECTED TO ILLICIT DRUG
TRAFFICKING AND OTHER SERIOUS OFFENSES, art. 1, § 9 (as amended in 1998)
[hereinafter CICAD, MODEL REGULATIONS].
184.

Id. art. 7(d).

185.

Id. art. 7(f).

186.
187.

See id. art. 10, §1(b).
See FinalReport, 1997, supranote 13, at 7-8.
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d.
Cooperation with the CICAD Working Group on the
Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism
The Group of Experts agreed that they would offer their
assistance and technical capabilities to the CICAD Working Group
on the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism. The assistance would
permit the experts can help with anti-money laundering
evaluation, so that once the OAS members agree to undertake
188
multilateral evaluations of the member's counterdrug policies.
e. Permanent Council Working Group
The Group of Experts reviewed the draft resolution to the
OAS General Assembly of the Permanent Council Working
Group-that was established to consider the desirability of an
Inter-American convention against money laundering.' 8 9 The
Experts will advise the working group of their own views on a
convention from its technical perspective.
4. Analysis
The expansion of the anti-money laundering efforts in the
Western Hemisphere to include serious crimes rather than just
drug trafficking brings this group current with practice in the rest
of the world. The consideration of a multilateral evaluation
mechanism, the exchange of information, training, and even a

convention are all efforts to strengthen compliance and indicate
broader political agreement and acceptance of the purposes of
anti-money laundering.
The ongoing assessment, 190 the establishment of FIUs, and
the typologies exercise are small steps towards cooperation in
hemispheric anti-money laundering enforcement.
Meaningful
and effective cooperation, harmonization of laws and standards,
and effective establishment of an anti-money laundering regime
must await the establishment of a proper network. A solid legal
infrastructure with funding for professionals is needed for
intensive and daily work on compliance with conventions and
resolutions, harmonization of laws, collaboration on common

188. See FinalReport, 1998, supra note 182, at 7.
189. See id.
190. Developing an ongoing evaluation or assessment of counterdrug
policies and their implementation is part of a broader hemispheric initiative that
was discussed at the Santiago Summit in April 1998. See, e.g., Bruce Zagaris, U.S.
Considers an Initiative on Enhanced Multilateral Drug Control Cooperation, 13 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 491 (1997).
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and

common

approaches to operational problems.

At present, the governments and international organizations
in the Western Hemisphere are searching for ways to develop ad
hoc solutions to individual criminal problems, such as anti-money
laundering.
III. SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
Since the initiation of international anti-money laundering
efforts in the mid-1980s, various substantive requirements have
been established: the requirement to criminalize money
laundering activities; the requirement that covered persons must
know-their-customer; the requirement to identify and report to
authorities suspicious transactions; the requirement to freeze,
trace, seize,
and ultimately forfeit the proceeds and
instrumentalities of money laundering crimes; the requirement of
covered persons to have a compliance officer and to train
employees; the requirement for covered persons to have outside
audits the compliance of their organization with anti-money
laundering standards; and the prohibition of secrecy as a reason
for a country and covered persons to refuse to follow any of the
anti-money laundering obligations. 191
In U.S. law, the main provisions of anti-money laundering are
found in Titles 12, 18 and 31 of the U.S. Code.
The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA)19 2 was a precursor to

anti-money laundering. It was intended to deter laundering and
the use of secret foreign bank accounts.
It established an
investigative "paper trail" for large currency transactions by
establishing regulatory reporting standards and requirements,

such as the Currency Transaction Report requirement (CTR Form
4789). This requirement early distinguished the United States
from other countries' approach to anti-money laundering. The
BSA imposed civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance with
its reporting requirements. It was designed to improved the
detection and investigation of criminal, tax, and regulatory
violations. A unique aspect of U.S. anti-money laundering laws
that other countries are starting to emulate is the simultaneous
use of anti-money laundering, tax, regulatory, and even criminal,
-especially organized crime-goals.

191.
See generally CICAD, MODEL REGULATIONS, supra, note 183.
192.
Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12, 18, 131 U.S.C.).
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The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986,193 which was
part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, created three new
criminal offenses for money laundering activities by, through, or
to a financial institution: (1) knowingly helping launder money; (2)
knowingly engaging-including by being willfully blind-in a

transaction of more than $10,000 that involves property from
criminal activity; and (3) structuring transactions to avoid the
BSA reporting.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988194 strengthened anti-money
laundering by: significantly increasing civil, criminal and
forfeiture sanctions for laundering crimes and BSA violations,
including forfeiture of "any property, real or personal, involved in
a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of laws"
relating to the filing of Currency Transaction Reports, money
laundering, or structuring transactions; requiring stronger and
more precise identification and recording of cash purchases of
certain monetary instruments; allowing the Treasury Department
to require financial institutions to file additional, geographically
targeted reports; requiring the Treasury Department to negotiate
bilateral international agreements covering the recording of large
U.S. currency transactions and the sharing of such information;
and increasing the criminal sanction for tax evasion when money
from criminal activity is involved.
In 1992, the Housing and Community Development Act of
1992195 made changes in anti-money laundering laws.
It
strengthened penalties for financial institutions violating antimoney laundering laws, and allows regulators to close or seize
institutions by appointing a conservator or receiver or terminating
the institution's charges. Regulators can suspend or remove
institution-affiliated parties who have violated the BSA or been
indicted for money laundering or criminal activity under the BSA.
It forbids any individual convicted of money laundering from
unauthorized participation in any federally insured institutions.
Under the Annunzio-Wylie Act, the Treasury must issue
regulations requiring national banks and other depository
institutions to identify which of their account holders-other than
other depository institutions or regulated broker dealers-are
non-bank financial institutions, such as money transmitters or
check cashing services. Treasury, along with the Federal Reserve,
must promulgate regulations requiring financial institutions and

193.
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat.
3207 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 18, 131 U.S.C.).
194.
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181
(codified as amended in scattered sections U.S.C.).
195.
Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102550, 106 Stat. 3672 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
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other entities that cash checks, transmit money, or perform
similar services to maintain records of domestic and international
wire transfers that are useful in law enforcement investigations.
Under the Act, the U.S. Government has established a BSA
Advisory Group that includes representatives from the
Departments of Treasury as well as Justice, and the Office of
National Drug Control Policy and other interested persons and
financial institutions. The group was created for the purpose of
developing a harmonious private-public cooperation on anti-

money laundering.
Under the Annunzio-Wylie Act, 19 6 Treasury can require
financial institutions to adopt anti-money laundering programs
that include: internal policies, procedures, and controls;
designation of a compliance officer; and continuation of an
ongoing employee training program; and an independent audit
function to test the adequacy of the program.
Treasury can require any financial institution, or any
financial institution employee, to report suspicious transactions
relevant to possible violation of law or regulation under the
protection from civil suit arising from such reports by virtue of a
"safe harbor."
The American Bankers' Association and the
banking industry had long sought such a safe harbor.
Under the Act, a financial institution or employee may be
prosecuted for "tipping off-that is, if they disclose, to the subject
of a referral or a grand jury subpoena, that a criminal referral has
been filed or a grand jury investigation has been started
concerning a possible crime of money laundering and BSA laws.
Officers who improperly disclose information concerning a grand
jury subpoena for bank records are subject to prosecution.
A. The 1998 U.S. Money LaunderingAct: Fostering
Partnershipsand Better Targeting

Before adjourning in 1998, Congress considered and almost
enacted the Money Laundering Deterrence Act of 1998.197 On
October 5, 1998, it passed in the House, but died in the Senate.
Because it has the support of the Administration and many other
people, the bill is worth considering. It would amend title 31 of
the U.S. Code to improve methods for preventing financial crimes,
and for other purposes. It amends Title 31 of the U.S. Code to
improve methods for preventing financial crimes. 198
196.
Stat. 4044
197.
(1998).
198.

Annuzio-Wylie Act Anti-Money Launder Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
Money Laundering Deterrence Act of 1998, H.R. 4005, 105th Cong.
See id. § 2(b).
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Section 2 notes that organized crime groups are continually
devising new methods to launder money, "including the use of
financial service providers that are not depository institutions,
such as money transmitters and check cashing services, the
purchase and resale of durable goods," and the exchange of black
market foreign currency. 19 9 The involvement of international
criminal enterprises engaged in money laundering is complex,
diverse, and fragmented. Many foreign gangs and groups have
financial management and organizational infrastructures that are
highly sophisticated and difficult to track because of the
globalization of the financial service industry.
Section 2 lists as the purposes of the Act to provide the law

enforcement community with the necessary legal authority to
combat money laundering, to broaden the law enforcement
community's access to transactional information already being
collected" in a non-financial trade or business, and "[t]o expedite
the issuance by the Secretary of the Treasury of regulations
designed to deter money laundering activities at certain types of
20 0
financial institutions."
Section 3 amends the suspicious activity reporting requirements in the Bank Secrecy Act to facilitate the flow of financial
regulatory agencies. 2 0 1 Subsection (a) broadens the "safe harbor"
provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 5318 to independent public accountants
who file Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR).20 2 It is hoped that
accountants conducting audits and routine examinations of a
financial institution's books and records will report wrongdoing.
Subsection (b) limits the circumstances under which the filing of
a SAR may be disclosed. 20 3 Subsection (c) "provides financial
institutions with immunity from liability when making
employment references that include suspicion of a prospective
employee's possible involvement in a violation of law or
regulation," unless the financial institution knows such suspicion
"to be false or if the institution acts with malice or reckless
disregard for the truth in making such a reference." 2s 4
Subsection (d) makes SARs available to self-regulatory
organizations as defined by the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934.205

199.
Id. § 2(a)(3).
200.
Id. § 2(b)(1)-(3).
201.
H.R. Rept. 105-611, pt. 1, at 20 (1998) (discussing the proposed Money
Laundering Deterrence At of 1998).
202.
See id
203.

See id.

204.

Id.

205.

See id.
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Section 4 expands the scope of the summons authority under
31 U.S.C. § 5318(b)(1) from merely "investigations for the purpose of
civil enforcement" of the Bank Secrecy Act to "examinations to
determine compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act, as well as
investigations relating to reports filed pursuant to the Act."20 6 The
expanded summons authority will help in the case of non-depository
institutions whose activities are not subject to regulatory oversight.
Section 5 "clarifies existing statutory language making it illegal
to violate reporting requirements mandated by a geographic
targeting order issued by the Secretary of the Treasury or the funds

transfer record-keeping rules.'2 °7
Section 6 eliminates Treasury Secretary's obligation "to report
to Congress on the status of states' adoption of uniform laws

regulating money transmitters."20 8 The Treasury Department's
recently promulgated regulations for Money Services Businesses,
which include money transmitters, has rendered this directive
20 9
unnecessary.
Section 7 "exempts Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements,
including those imposed by geographic targeting orders, from
2 10
consideration under the Paperwork Reduction Act."

Section 8 "transfers from the Internal Revenue Code to the
Bank Secrecy Act the requirement that any person engaged in a
trade or business (other than financial institutions required to
report under the Bank Secrecy Act) file a report with the Federal
government on cash transactions in excess of $10,000."211
Reports made pursuant to this requirement "provide law
enforcement authorities with a paper trail that can help identify a
lifestyle that is not commensurate with an individual's known
sources of legitimate income."212
Under prior law, non-financial institutions had to report cash
transactions exceeding $10,000 to the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) on IRS Form 8300.213 Because such reports must be filed
pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, Form 8300 information is
considered tax return information. 2 14 As such, it
may not be disclosed to any persons or used in any manner not
authorized by the Internal Revenue Code. Authorized disclosures
of Form 8300 information are subject to the procedural and recordkeeping requirements of Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue

206.

Id.

207.
208.

Id.
Id. at 21.

209.

See id.

210.

Id.

211.
212.

Id.
Id.

213.

See id.

214.

See id.
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Code. For example, Section 6103(p)(4)(E) requires agencies seeking
Form 8300 information to file a report with the Secretary of the
Treasury that describes the procedures established and utilized by
2 15
the agency for ensuring the confidentiality of the information.

The IRS requires that agencies requesting Form 8300 information
file a "Safeguard Procedures Report," which must be approved by
2 16
the IRS before such information can be released.
While the IRS uses Form 8300 to identify individuals who
may be engaged in tax evasion, the information collected on the
form can also be useful to other law enforcement agencies
investigating other financial crimes, including money laundering.
Form 8300 information can be instrumental in helping law
enforcement authorities trace cash payments by drug traffickers
and other criminals for luxury cars, jewelry, and other expensive
merchandise. However, Form 8300s are not accessible to law
enforcement authorities and, as a result of the above-mentioned
restrictions under Section 6103, they cannot be retrieved
electronically from a database maintained by the Treasury
Department. 2 17 The change will make the reports much more
accessible.
Section 9 requires that within 120 days of enactment the
Treasury must promulgate know-your-customer regulations for
financial institutions.2 1 8
The regulations have been under
discussion and study among Federal banking and financial
regulatory agencies, including the Treasury Department, the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. 2 19 The regulations "are intended to assist financial
institutions in verifying that their customers' funds are derived
2 20
from legitimate sources."
Section 10 extends the statute of limitations period from one
to two years in forfeitable fungible property in bank accounts
under 18 U.S.C. § 984.221 It provides that all bank deposits are
fungible and authorizes the forfeiture of money held to prove that
the money in the account on one day is the "same money" as was
222
in the account on a prior occasion.
Section 11 requires the Treasury Secretary,

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
See id.
See id. at 21-22.
See id.at 22.
See id.
Id.
See id.at 23.
Id.
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in consultation with "federal banking agencies" and within one year
of enactment of [the law], to prepare a report on the nature and
extent of private banking activities in the U.S.; regulatory efforts to
monitor private banking activities and ensure that they are
conducted in compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act; and policies
and procedures of depository institutions that are designed to
ensure that private banking activities are conducted in compliance
2 23
with the Bank Secrecy Act.

Section 12 requires the Treasury Secretary,
to prescribe regulations requiring financial institutions to maintain
all accounts in such a way as to ensure that the name of an
account holder and the number of the account are associated with
all account activity of the account holder, and to ensure that all
such information is available for purposes of account supervision
22 4
and law enforcement.

Section 13 "expresses the sense of the Congress that the
Secretary of the Treasury should make available to all Federal,
State and local law enforcement agencies and financial regulatory
agencies the full contents of the electronic database of reports
22 5
required to be filed under the Bank Secrecy Act."
Section 14 "directs the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with
appropriate
Federal law
enforcement
authorities, to develop criteria . . . to identify areas outside the
[United States] in which money laundering activities are
concentrated, and to designate any areas so identified as foreign

high intensity money laundering areas, 226
Section 15 "authorizes the doubling of criminal penalties for
Bank Secrecy Act violations committed with respect to a
transaction involving a person in, a relationship maintained in, or
transport of a monetary instrument involving a foreign country
known to have been designated as a foreign high intensity money
laundering area" pursuant to Section 14,227 which refers to the
portions of the Department of State's annual International
Narcotics Strategy Control Report that identifies foreign countries
228
that serve as safe havens for money laundering.
B. Erosion of Secrecy
For professionals involved in the international transfer of
wealth techniques, financial privacy is an important principle.
Fiduciaries have obligations under law-both common law and

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 25.
See id. § 15.
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statutory law in some countries-contract, and ethics to uphold

confidentiality. Increasingly, in the era of globalization and since
the start of the anti-money laundering regime in the mid-1980s,
secrecy is sometimes overridden by obligations of banks, financial
institutions, solicitors, and other covered persons to "know their
customer" (or client) and identify and report suspicious
transactions.
Two developments indicate the fragility and nature of
exceptions to bank secrecy: the initiatives to rectify the Nazi gold
losses and the intensive efforts by liquidators of a Cayman bank
to recover computer bank records turned over by its former
chairman and managing director to the U.S. Government.
1. Swiss Foreign Minister Reassures Swiss Bankers on Secrecy
One of the exceptions to bank and business secrecy has been
the effort to ascertain the extent of wrongdoing and pay
compensation to the victims of the Holocaust. The effort is
sometimes referred to as the Nazi gold debacle. The various
investigations, agreements, and lawsuits all have succeeded in
overcoming bank secrecy in Switzerland and other countries, and
demonstrate yet another exception to such secrecy.
In this
context, the Swiss Government has tried to assure its investors
2 29
about its efforts to maintain legitimate secrecy.
On September 5, 1997, Flavio Cotti, Switzerland's foreign
minister, assured Swiss bankers that the Swiss Government
would not buckle to international demands to dilute Switzerland's
bank secrecy laws, one of the main factors for Switzerland's
dominance in the private banking business. 2 3 0 His remarks were

made during the annual meeting of the Swiss Bankers
Association (SBA) in Berne and were designed to reassure Swiss
bankers that Swiss authorities are aware of the financial risks
facing the banks in the aftermath of growing criticism of the
banks' wartime role in dealing with the accounts of Holocaust
23
victims and looted Nazi gold. '
According to Cotti, the Swiss Government would ensure that
the Swiss banking industry remains a "central pillar of the Swiss
economy."23 2 The banking sector generates ten percent of gross
domestic product, employs 108,000 people, and contributes
23 3
eleven percent of tax revenues.

229.
Sept. 6-7,
230.
231.
232.
233.

See William Hall, Cotti Reassures Swiss Bankers, FN. TIMES (London),
1997, at 2.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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Cotti complimented Swiss bankers for helping improve
Switzerland's international image and for the "extraordinary
speed" with which they had prepared a "package of measures
comparable to no other."23 4 In addition, Cotti noted that the
issue of "unfair tax competition" had assumed greater significance
and that "Swiss banking secrecy and other laws supporting the
Swiss financial centre had become frequent targets of criticism at
23 5
OECD meeting."

Cotti also discussed the role of the Swiss banking community
in accepting assets of "dubious origin from heads of state."23 6 In
this connection, the Swiss Government had responded in an
"active and efficient manner" in 1997 to block the Swiss bank
accounts of ex-President Mobutu. 23 7 The lessons from this and
other cases is that "[tihe efficiency of Switzerland's financial
cent[er] attracts assets of criminal or dubious origin and it was in
the deepest interests of the financial centre to keep such monies
23 8
at a distance."
Ultimately, the lifting of bank secrecy helped facilitate the
agreement
announced
on August
12,
1998,
whereby
representatives of Swiss commercial banks and Holocaust
survivors reached a settlement, in which the banks agreed to "pay
$1.25 billion in reparations to victims of the Nazi era, in exchange
for the
dismissal of three class action
suits ... and
recommendations by the victims groups that the state and local
23 9
authorities cancel plans to impose sanctions."
Cotti's remarks and the lifting of bank secrecy to resolve the
controversy over the claims of Holocaust victims indicate the
transition that the Swiss government and private sector are
undergoing with respect to bank secrecy, vetting to exclude
illegitimate money, the new anti-money laundering regime
concerning "know-your-customer", "identifying and reporting
suspicious transactions", "criminalizhig money laundering", and
freezing and forfeiting illegal proceeds and the instrumentalities of
the same.
The transition becomes more complex when
governments, international organizations,
non-governmental
organizations, and public opinion assess and impose moral
judgments about the private sector and the government's role
during World War II nearly forty years later.

234.

Id.

235.

Id.

236.

Id.

237.

Id.

238.

Id.

239.

Swiss Banks Reach Agreement over Holocaust Claims, 14

ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 382-83 (1998).
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2. U.S. Court Denies Cayman's Petition to Obtain Seized Bank
Records
A case involving an effort by the Cayman Government to
reclaim computer bank records obtained from a former managing
director and target of a U.S. law enforcement proceeding provides
a perspective of the practical limitations of bank secrecy in an
increasingly shrinking world. On May 7, 1997, the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey issued an order denying a
petition by liquidators of a Cayman bank seeking the return of its
computer bank records that its former chairman and managing
director had turned over to the U.S. Government. 240
The
managing director was a target of a law enforcement proceeding
when he "voluntarily" turned over the documents. 2 4 1
The
liquidator then filed a petition for the return of property pursuant
2 42
to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e).
On January 18, 1995, the Cayman Government appointed an
interim controller to take control of the affairs of the offshore
bank. 2 43 At the time, the offshore bank had approximately 1,000
clients, including corporations, trusts and individuals, some of
2 44
which were U.S. residents.
On January 24, 1994, the Cayman Government revoked the
offshore bank's "category B' Bank & Trust company licenses" and
closed the bank. 245 The Cayman Government also filed a petition
for an order to wind-up the affairs of the offshore bank due to
"serious irregularities" identified in the conduct of the offshore
bank's business. 24 6 On February 10, 1995, the Grand Court of
the Cayman Islands ordered the offshore bank "wound up"
(liquidated).247
On June 21, 1996, a federal grand jury in Newark, New
Jersey returned a multi-count indictment charging the individual
248
defendant and others with conspiracy and money laundering.
FBI agents subsequently arrested the individual defendant.
In June 1996, the individual defendant gave the FBI a tape
containing "copies of certain computer back-up tapes containing
detailed financial and operating records of the [Offshore]
Bank."2 4 9

The individual defendant voluntarily gave the tape to

240.
241.

See Johnson v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 862 (D.N.J. 1997).
See id. at 864.

242.
243.

See id. at 863.
See id.

244.
245.
246.
247.

See id.

Id at 864.
Id.
See id.

248.

See id.

249.

Id.
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the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) "without the issuance of
25 0 It remains
a warrant, subpoena or other compulsory 2process."
s1
Government.
U.S.
the
of
possession
in the
The FBI contacted the Royal Cayman Islands Police and
sought assistance in its efforts to gain access to the information
stored on the tape. 25 2 On August 6, 1996, Christopher Johnson,
the liquidator, "filed a formal, written complaint of the 'theft' of
the tape to the Cayman Police."25 3 The petition focused on the
inevitability of the eventual transferal of the tape to the IRS "for
the purpose of investigating and, where appropriate, prosecuting
254
any bank clients subject to U.S. taxation."
The Advisory Committee's Report for Rule 41(e) of the Federal
Rules Criminal Procedure provides "that an aggrieved person may
seek return of property that has been unlawfully seized, and a
person whose property has been lawfully seized may seek return
of property when aggrieved by the [Glovernment's continued
possession of it." 25 5 Moreover, Rule 41(e) allows a court to "order

either the originals or copies of seized documents be returned to
their owner and permit the Government access and/or use of the
information." 2 5 6 Using four factors in entertaining a Rule 41(e)
motion, the court denied the order.
The first factor is "whether the Government displayed a
257
callous disregard for the constitutional rights of the petitioner."
2 58
The Cayman liquidator and government did not meet the test.
The Johnson court noted that the U.S. Government had no role in
the procurement of the tape.2 5 9 Instead, the individual defendant
voluntarily provided the tape to the U.S. Government. 2 60 Since
there was no U.S. Government involvement in the procurement of
the tape, no constitutional rights were at issue in the instant
case.2 6 1 Thus, the Johnson court held that the rights afforded by
the Fourth Amendment are "wholly inapplicable to a 'search or
seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private

250.
251.
duplicate
252.
253.
254.

Id.
See id. The tape in the possession of the U.S. Government contains "a
of substantially all of the [offshore] Bank's records." Id. at 865.
See id.
Id.
Id.

255.
Report).
256.

Id. at 865-66 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e), Advisory Committee's

257.

Id. at 866.
Id.

258.

See id.

259.
260.

See id.
See id.

261.

See id.

1999]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS .INANTI-MONEY LAUNDERNG 1067

individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the
2 62
participation or knowledge of any government official."'
Because the documents were voluntarily given to the U.S.
Government, the latter's "use of the [tiape in its investigation of
the suspected tax evasion scheme and other suspected financial
crimes connected to the [o]ffshore [blank and in future
prosecutions will not violate the constitutional rights of the
2 63
[o]ffshore [blank or any of its clients."
The second factor the Johnson court considered was whether
the petitioner had an individual interest in and need for the
property he wanted returned. 264 The court found against the
petitioner, stating that the petitioner already possessed the
information contained on the tape and, hence, its return did not
appear necessary for petitioner to carry on the offshore bank's

business.265

That the offshore bank was in liquidation and

apparently would be defunct shortly invalidated the claim that
266
petitioners did not need the tape to undertake their duties.
The Johnson court found unpersuasive the speculative
argument that the use of the tape may expose the offshore bank
to "numerous complaints and claims" because U.S. nationals are
in any event "required to reveal the existence of foreign bank
accounts and report certain foreign transactions." 2 67
The
reporting requirement meant that the U.S. nationals lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the offshore bank records. 2 68
Upon consideration of the third factor, the Johnson court
found that the offshore bank would not suffer "irreparable harm"
if the tape was not returned, since the offshore bank's licenses
269
have been revoked and the bank was in liquidation.
The court also considered and rejected the fourth factor,
whether the petitioners had an adequate remedy at law. 2 70 Even
if the petitioner was able to establish that the bank would suffer
irreparable harm, the court found that the exercise of equitable
jurisdiction to forbid the Government the use of the tape was not
justified.2 7 1 Generally, even when the U.S. Government
improperly has possession of evidence, and when the aggrieved

262.

Id. at 867 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14

(1984)); see also United States v. Kinney, 953 F.2d 863, 865 (4th Cir. 1992).

263.

Id. at 866-67

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See id. at 866.
See id.at 867.
See id. at 868.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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party's Rule 41(d) motion is successful, courts have permitted the
2 72
Government to retain copies of the evidence.
The Johnson court rejected the petitioners' argument that the
doctrine of international comity requires the suppression of the
tapes.2 73 While comity is "the spirit of cooperation in which a
domestic tribunal approaches the resolution of cases touching the
laws and interests of other sovereign states," it must yield to
domestic policy.2 74 In particular, the Johnson court stated that
no country will suffer the law of another to interfere with its own
to the injury of its citizens. 2 75 Here, the court noted that the U.S.
Government declared that the information on the tape constitute
"significant evidence" of a "widespread tax evasion scheme" and
has "initiated multiple investigations concerning suspected
2 76
criminal activities by customers of the [Offshore] bank."
The Johnson court rejected the arguments that disclosure of
the information contained on the tape to U.S. Government
agencies, such as the IRS, may expose the offshore bank to
The court noted that,
numerous complaints and claims. 277
notwithstanding the Cayman Government's claim that its Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Treaty enabled the United
States to obtain the information on the tapes from it on request,
the U.S. Government is not able to obtain information on pure tax
278
matters under the Cayman-U.S. MLAT.
In rejecting the arguments of the petitioner under
international comity, the Johnson court found the speculative
arguments regarding harm that may result to the offshore bank
and the banking industry of the Cayman Government insufficient
to overcome the interest of the United States in its ongoing
27 9
criminal investigation.
The case represents a setback to Cayman secrecy and
indicates the practical limitations of secrecy. Any person who
relies on secrecy of one country now must factor into the equation

272.
See id. at 869; Ramsden v. United States, 2 F.3d 322, 327 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1058 (1994).
273.
See Johnson v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 862, 874 (D.N.J. 1997).
274.
Id. at 870 (quoting Soci~td Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United
States Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 543 n.7 (1987)).
275.

See id. (quoting Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43

F.3d 65, 75 (3d Cir. 1994)).
276. Id. (alteration in original)
277.
278.

279.

See id. at 870-74.
See id. at 870-72.
See id. at 872-73.
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the limitations that may eventually eliminate the confidentiality
28 0
on which it seeks to rely.

C. Due Diligence
Since the mid-1980s, a major component of international
anti-money laundering
efforts has been
due diligence
requirements. These requirements include: the duty to knowyour-client, the duty to identify and report to authorities
suspicious transactions, the requirement to appoint a compliance
officer with access to the top executives of an organization, the
duty to train employees on anti-money laundering, and the duty
to ensure that anti-money laundering obligations are properly
audited so that any violations will be detected and remedied.
Increasingly, those bodies covered by due diligence include non-

bank financial institutions, such as money transmitters.

In

addition, the requirements for bank and financial supervisors to
monitor and audit continue to multiply. 2 8 ' On November 19,
1998, the release by the British Government of its report on
financial services in the Channel Islands initiated a number of
changes in due diligence to prevent and combat money
28 2
laundering.
1. U.K. Edwards Report on Channel Islands Calls for Improved
Due Diligence against Anti-Money Laundering
In its November 1998 report on problems in international
financial services in the Channel Islands, the British Government
called for reforms, many of which presage similar reforms it will
demand from other offshore territories. 28 3 The so-called Edwards
report-named for its author, a former top official at the British
Treasury-reviews financial supervision in the Channel Islands

280.

For background on the case, see Cayman Liquidators Sue to Recover

Bank Documents from U.S. Government, 13 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REp. 14-15

(1997).
281. See, e.g., Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive
amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the
use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, and the attached
Explanatory Memorandum, especially Articles 3 and 6 expanding due diligence
requirements for the private sector and Articles 1 and 2, requiring EU members to
expand the person's covered by due diligence.
282. See George Graham and Robert Wright, UK Seeks Tighter Curbs from
Offshore Tax Havens, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1998, at 1.
283.

See REVIEW OF FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE CROWN DEPENDENCIES, 1998,

Cmnd. 4109 [hereinafter EDWARDS REPORT] <http://visar.csustdn.educ/aaba/ersey.
htm>; George Graham & Robert Wright, Move to Tighten Tax Haven Rules, FIN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 20, 1998, at 1.
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(consisting of Guernsey, Jersey, and the Isle of Man) and calls on
them to strengthen restrictions on offshore companies and start
cooperating with foreign financial investigations. 2 84 Lord Williams,
a British Home Office minister, subsequently agreed to chair a
series of meetings with the three territories starting in January
1999, to follow up on the list of proposed reforms in the Edwards
report.
The Edwards Report applauds the efforts of the islands, which
are self-governing dependencies of the British crown, to strengthen
standards in their £350 million financial industry. The report notes
that one-third of investments come from U.K. residents. 2 85
However, the report contains detailed recommendations for major
reforms focusing especially on the rules for establishing offshore
companies and trusts used to shelter assets from tax or from
outside scrutiny. 2 86 While all three islands have accepted the
recommendations generally, they resist a number of specific

recommendations-such as requiring companies to file audited
accounts, and, in the case of the Isle of Man, vetting companies
established on the island-in the hope that new measures to control
7
company agents will solve the problem. 28
The report calls on all of the islands to improve the regulation
of companies and company directors. 2 88 The islands' low tax
rates and relatively flexible regulatory controls have attracted
large numbers of international companies. Approximately
100,0000 companies are incorporated in the islands, especially in
the Isle of Man. 2 89 Many more are administered from, but not
incorporated in, the islands.2 9 0
According to former Minister
Edwards, company regulation requires tightening in all three
islands.2 9 1 The priority for the authorities in all three islands is
to cooperate fully with other countries in the pursuit of financial
2 92
crime and money laundering.
In recent years, several high profile financial court cases have
called attention to the Channel Islands' regulatory procedures.
For example, in 1998 Bank Cantrade was forced to pay fines of $3
million because one of its traders had misled investors by
showing profits of $15 million on foreign currency transactions

284.
See EDWARDS REPORT, supranote 258.
285.
See id. at 2.
286.
See id. at 3-30, 135-39.
287.
See id. at 9; see also UK Report on Channel Islands Call for More
International Tax and Anti-Money Laundering Cooperation and Presages Tougher
Regime for Offshore Territories, 15 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 1 (1999).
288.
289.

See id.
See id.

290.
291.
292.

See id.
See id.
at 9-10.
See id. at 13-18.
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when he had actually lost $11 million. 2 93 In 1995, when the
Barings merchant bank failed, "the bank's Guernsey subsidiary
had lent deposits well in excess of its capital base and was
technically insolvent. However, the unit was not declared
2 94
insolvent while the authorities tried to find a buyer."
According to the Edwards Report, these and other cases
indicate the need for more on-site inspections of financial
institutions as well as the need some kind for of reform,
moratorium, or administration procedures as in the United
Kingdom to assist them in dealing with insolvency. 2 95 The report
also calls for a financial ombudsman to deal with customer
2 96
complaints.
The Edwards Report recommends that the Isle of Man
Thousands of
strengthen its regulation of companies. 2 9 7
companies are incorporated in the Isle of Man and thousands
more are administered from Guernsey and Jersey, if not actually
incorporated there. 2 98 Most of the companies are private and
formed by non-residents or trusts to hold assets or interests
outside the islands.2 9 9 The Isle of Man has no system to vet new
companies that want to register or for persons to obtain
disclosure about the companies already registered.
For Guernsey, the Edwards report calls for dealing with the
problem of nominee directors-the so called "Sark lark."3 0 0 This
phenomenon involves residents of Sark, a small island under
Guernsey's jurisdictions, who sit as directors on many different
company boards. While the population of Sark is only 575, the total
Three
directorships held amount to approximately 15,000.301
302
residents hold between 1,600 and 3,000 directorships each.
Guernsey has started to crack down on "false domiciles,"
whereby islanders were responding to phone calls for companies
located elsewhere. 3 0 3 However, the island has resisted divesting
30 4
residents of their directorships.

293.
See Report Urges ChannelIslands to Tighten Rules, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 20,
1998, at 51.
294.

Id.

295.

EDwARDS REPORT, supranote 283, at 5-6.

296.

See id. at 5, 20.

297.

See id. at 7-10.

298.
299.

See id. at 9.
See id.

300.
301.

See id. at 82-83.
See id.

302.
See id. at 82.
303.
See id.at 83.
See Charles Piggott, Stamping Out the Sark Lark: War Is Being Waged
304.
Against 'Nominee Directors"in Tax Havens, INDEPENDENT (London), June 27, 1999,
at 6.
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In general, the islands reacted positively to the Edwards
report. However, bankers complained that the report's
recommendations would erode client confidentiality.3 0 5
The
financial industry is likely to oppose and resist many of the
detailed
changes,
including
comprehensive
customer
compensation schemes in Jersey and Guernsey, and some
changes in trust law.
The Edwards report recommends the establishment of a
confidential hotline for whistle blowers, such as the person who
reported improprieties in Cantrade, but was ignored by his
superiors.3 0 6 Jersey authorities are considering providing
statutory protection for such informers.
The Jersey Bankers Associations has indicated that it favors
the release of information to other authorities where the latter are
investigating crimes.3 0 7 However, they worry about "areas which
potentially affect the fine dividing line between protecting [their]
clients' confidentiality and the disclosure of information about
customer affairs to authorities outside the jurisdiction of
308
Jersey."
The preparation and release of the Edwards report takes
place in the context of the OECD Report on Harmful Tax
Competition and the EU initiative towards tax harmonization and
imposing minimum withholding tax, reporting requirements for
the payment of interest to residents of other EU countries earned
on bank deposits in the other host country, or both.3 0 9 In fact,
the United Kingdom's membership in the European Union has
been a contributing element in its own initiatives to strengthen
international financial supervision in its dependent and overseas
310
territories.
The Edwards report takes a balanced approach of
acknowledging and applauding the comparatively favorable
financial supervisory standards in the three islands, considering
the dependence of each of the islands on international financial
business. 3 1 1 The recommendations recognize the need to help
the international financial services sector evolve rather than
trying to destroy them. The pragmatic approach to improving
financial supervisory standards is prudent, especially given the

305.
(London),
306.
307.
308,
309.
(London),
310.
311.

Brian Groom, Regulators Jubilant as Critics are 'Routed', FIN. TIMES
Nov. 20, 1998, at 10.
See EDWARDS REPORT, supranote 283, at 8.
See Groom, supranote 305, at 10.
Id.
See Jim Kelly, EUPuts Futureof 'Unfair"Havens in Question, FIN. TIMES
Nov. 20, 1998, at 10.
See EDWARDS REPORT, supranote 283, at 4, 115.
Offshore Verdict, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 20, 1998, at 25.
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positive attitude of the three jurisdictions to cooperate in the
implementation of the recommendations.
Regulators and
professionals in jurisdictions in which international financial
services are an important part of the economy will recognize that
many recommendations of the Edwards report will be adopted by
international organizations active in the relevant subject matter
areas.

2. The Proposed U.S. Know-Your-Customer Rule Will Formalize
Internal Control Procedures

a. The Proposed Regulations
The proposed know-your-customer regulation contained in
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System's
memorandum dated September 28, 1998, requires banks to
develop for the first time their know-your-customer program, and
continues to generate discussion. 3 12 The proposed rule will also
apply eventually to non-bank financial institutions and will have
broad implications for private banking, offshore accounts, and the
imposition of responsibility on covered persons to design,
implement, and regularly update and adjust their know-your3 13
customer internal control systems.
The proposed regulation will require institutions supervised
by the Federal Reserve Board to develop and implement a knowyour-customer program.3 14
According to the proposal, the
establishment of a know-your-customer program is designed to
protect the reputation of the bank; facilitate the bank's compliance
with all applicable statutes and regulations (including the Bank
Secrecy Act and the Board's suspicious activity reporting
regulations) and with safe and sound banking practices; and
protect the bank from becoming a vehicle for or a victim of illegal
31 5
activities perpetrated by its customers.

Because the Board recognized that banks vary considerably
in the way in which they conduct their business, the proposal
permits each bank to develop its own know-your-customer
program as a system designed to meet the goals of the

312.
For background, see Bruce Zagaris, U.S. FederalReserve Will Issue New
'Know Your Customer" Regulations, 14 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 445 (1998); see
also Know Your Customer, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,516 (1998) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pts. 208, 211, & 225) (proposed Dec. 7, 1998) (withdrawn 64 Fed. Reg. 15310,
Mar. 31, 1999).
313.
See Know Your Customer, 63 Fed. Reg. at 67,517.
314.
See id.
315.
1d. at 67,518.
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proposal.3 16 The proposed Federal Register notice will require
banks to develop a know-your-customer program that at least will
provide a system for handling the following tasks:
(1)

determining the true identities of the bank's
customers;
determining the customer's sources of funds for
transactions involving the bank, including the
types of instruments used and the sources from
which the funds were derived or generated;

(2)

(3) determining the specific customer's normal and
(4)

(5)

(6)

expected transactions involving the bank;
monitoring customer transactions to ascertain if
such transactions are consistent with normal
and expected transactions for that particular
customer or for customers in the same or similar
categories or classes, as established by the bank;
identifying customer transactions that do not
appear to be consistent with "normal and
expected transactions for that specific customer
or for customers in the same or similar
categories or classes, as established by the
bank"; and
ascertaining if a transaction is unusual or
suspicious, in accordance with the Board's
suspicious activity reporting regulations, and
3 17
reporting it accordingly.

The proposal permits each bank to decide how best,
consistent with its own business practices, it can identify its
customers, understand the normal and expected transactions of
its customers, and then monitor on an ongoing basis the
transactions of its customers. Under the proposal, a bank must
decide the know-your-customer program suited to its specific
needs, delineate the program in writing, and demonstrate that it
is complying with the program.3 18 The proposal will require banks
to understand to whom they are providing their services at the
start of the relationship, to develop an understanding of the
transactions the customers will be conducting, and then to
3 19
monitor the transactions of those customers.
Some banks, especially those offering private banking
services, have raised concerns about identifying their clients,
especially since a main tenet of such services is the confidentiality

316.
317.
318.
319.

See id.
See id. at 67,523.
See id.
See id.
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offered and demanded by these customers through the use of
intermediary entities, such as private investment companies,
trusts, private mutual funds, or investment advisory accounts,
and since these entities are often based at offshore locations. The
Federal Reserve is convinced that the beneficial owner's identity is
usually well known to bank personnel or that banks can obtain
waivers from their customers for any perceived restriction of the
release of beneficial owner information.
In this regard, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) seeks comments on
whether any actual or perceived invasion of personal privacy
3 20
interest is outweighed by the compliance benefit.
While the proposal's requirement of identifying the true
beneficial owner of each account of the bank is not intended to
force a bank to disclose information in violation of foreign law,
allowing any bank to avoid identification of beneficial ownership
of any account would defeat the main purpose of the proposed
rule-to ensure that each bank knows to whom it is offering its
service. In this connection, the proposed rule responds to the
criticism of a recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report that
U.S. banks lacked sufficient documentation regarding the
beneficial owners of offshore entities that maintained accounts in
321
the United States.
In response to concerns raised by several banks as to the
severe hardship and cost of the new monitoring requirements, the
Board of Governors has emphasized that the regulation will offer
flexibility and require banks to develop and implement effective
monitoring systems, commensurate with the risks presented by

the types of accounts maintained at the bank and the types of
transactions conducted through those accounts.3 2 2
The
effectiveness of the monitoring system of a bank's know-yourcustomer program will be based on that particular bank's ability
to monitor transactions consistent with the volume and types of
transactions conducted at the bank.32 3
The FDIC is seeking
comment on whether the benefits of implementing the know-yourcustomer requirements outweigh the costs involved and whether
there should be a minimum account size threshold below which
the requirements should be waived.
The design of a monitoring system should correspond to the
risk associated with the types of accounts maintained and types
of transactions conducted through those accounts. Hence, the
design of such a system

320.

See id. at 67,529-30.

321.
See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MONEY LAUNDERING:
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF OFFSHORE PRIVATE BANKING ACTIVITIES, 7-9 (June 1998).

322.
323.

See Know Your Customer, 63 Fed. Reg. at 67,517.
See id. at 67,521.
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could involve the classification of accounts into various categories
based on such factors as the type of account, the types of

transactions conducted in the various types of accounts, the size of
the account, the number and size of transactions conducted
through the account, and the risk of illicit activity associated with
the type of account and the transactions conducted through the
3 24
account.

For certain categories of accounts, it may be sufficient for an
effective monitoring system to establish parameters for which the
transactions within these accounts will normally occur. Instead
of monitoring each transaction, an effective monitoring system
may involve monitoring only for those transactions that exceed
the established parameters for that particular category of
3 25
accounts.
The proposed know-your-customer rule asks for the public to
provide input on specific questions. 3 2 6 The Federal Reserve
wants comments to focus on the proposed definition of "customer"
to ensure, at a minimum, that the definition is not overly broad
and adequately covers "beneficial" ownership-related issues.
Respondents are asked whether the proposal creates an uneven
playing field for non-bank financial institutions, such as money
3 27
transmitters and broker-dealers.
The proposed rule arises out of the Congressional hearings
that have produced the enactment of the Money Laundering
Deterrence Act of 1998, which requires that the Secretary of the
Treasury implement know-your-customer regulations within 120
days of passage of the legislation. 3 28 Congressman Leach's staff
informed the Federal Reserve that the primary reasons for the

provision in the draft legislation is to ensure that legal enforceable
regulations exist to require that financial institutions adopt knowyour-customer procedures and that similar regulations are
developed for the non-bank financial sector, including brokerdealers and money transmitters.
The Federal Reserve will
continue to work with FinCEN and will start to coordinate with
the staff of the SEC in helping program such rules for non-bank
financial institutions.
The Federal Reserve is awaiting feedback from other
regulatory agencies, especially the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) and the Office of the Thrift Supervision (OTS),
before submitting the proposal to the Federal Register. It is also
awaiting input from the Board of Directors of the FDIC on

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id. at 67,521.
See id.
See id. at 67,522.
See id.
See Zagaris, supranote 312, at 446.
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whether know-your-customer standards should be issued as
regulations or guidelines.
The Federal Reserve believes that the proposed know-yourcustomer rule will enable financial institutions to obtain
information from their customers regarding the identity, the types
of transactions to be conducted, and the source of funds, among
other things.3 29 Obtaining and reviewing such information will
assist financial institutions in making a risk-based determination
on various matters-including the extent of identifying necessary
information and the amount of monitoring required-by
permitting institutions to categorize their customers into different
groups based on the types of services being requested and the
330
magnitude and extent of the transactions being conducted.
Effective know-your-customer programs will require that banking
organizations develop "customer profiles" to understand their
customers' intended relationships with the institution and,
thereafter, to determine realistically when3 3customers
conduct
1
suspicious or potentially illegal transactions.
Legally, the Federal Reserve's proposal will revise 12 C.F.R.
pts. 208, 211, and 225 by requiring state member banks, certain
bank holding companies and their non-bank subsidiaries, U.S.
branches and agencies and other offices of foreign banks, and
Edge and Agreement corporations to develop and implement a
know-your-customer program within their institutions.33 2

The proposed rules define "customer" as "the person or entity
who has an account involving the receipt or disbursal of funds at
a bank and any other person or entity on behalf of whom such an
account is maintained." 333 The term encompasses direct and
indirect beneficiaries of the account when the activity in the
account involves the receipt or disbursal of funds. 3 34 "It also
includes a person or entity who owns or is represented by the
customer."33 s Hence, a customer would include an account
holder, a beneficial owner of an account, or a borrower. A
customer could also include "the beneficiary of a trust, an
investment fund, a pension fund or company whose assets are
managed by an asset manager, a controlling shareholder of a
closely held corporation or the grantor of a trust established in an
336
offshore jurisdiction."

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

See Know Your Customer, 63 Fed. Reg. at 67,516-17.
See id. at 67,517.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 67,518.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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The proposed rule underscores the need to target private
banking operations, since these customers utilize such account
vehicles as personal investment companies (PICs), trusts,
personal mutual investment funds, or are clients of financial
advisors.3 3 7
Such accounts help protect the legitimate
confidentiality and financial privacy of the customers that use
such accounts.
However, the need to identify properly the
beneficial owners of such accounts, through an effective knowyour-customer program, is required to continue safe and sound
operation of the bank. Hence, know-your-customer procedures
for identifying the beneficial owners of private bank accounts
should be no different than the procedures for identifying other
customers of the bank. By developing special protections to limit
access to information that would generally reveal the beneficial
owners of these accounts, a private bank can address any needed
338
confidentiality.
Once the proposed rule is published in the Federal Register,
the public will have sixty days from that date to comment on the
rule.3 3 9 The final rule may take effect at the start of the year
2000, Once the rule becomes final, the Federal Reserve will allow
covered financial institutions a six-month grace period to fully
implement know-your-customer programs, after which time bank
examiners may bring disciplinary action against institutions that
violate the rules.
During the annual American Bankers Association/American
Bar Association conference on money laundering, Susan Tucillo,
Vice-President and Senior Compliance Officer of Citibank, N.A.,
noted that the know-your-customer rules will generate a
substantial amount of new employment because of the complexity
of issues raised, thereby requiring "a fundamental retooling of the
branch operation process. "3 40 The proposed rules cover virtually
every product line and will particularly cause problems for
attorney trust accounts, escrow accounts, other high-turnover
attorney accounts, letters of credit, and other banking and
3 41
lending transactions.
The know-your-customer rule would require that banks
ensure that all documentation on accounts domiciled in the

337.
See id. at 67,520. The issuance by the Federal Reserve of Guidance on
Private Banking presaged the proposed rule. For a summary of the guidance and
its implications, see generally Federal Reserve Guidance on Private Banking
Requires New Due Diligencefrom Banks, 13 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 391 (1997).
338.
See Know Your Customer, 63 Fed. Reg. at 67,520.
339.
See id. at 67,516.
340.
S. Ali Sartipzadeh, "Know Your Customer" Proposed Rules Provoke
Criticism, Complaintsfrom Banks, DAILY REP. FOR EXEC., Nov. 4, 1998, at A-13.
341.
See id.
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United States. be made available to Federal Reserve examiners
within forty-eight hours

of a request.3 4 2

U.S.

banks are

concerned that these rules will limit their ability to do business in
offshore jurisdictions where they compete with foreign banks from
3 43
jurisdictions with less restrictive know-your-customer rules.
34 4
An important issue raised is the definition of customer.
The preamble explains that "customer" includes "direct and
indirect beneficiaries" of the account, as well as "a person or
entity who owns or is represented by the customer." The
proposed regulation specifically the beneficial owners of PICs,
trusts and "personal mutual investment funds," clients of
financial advisors, and "borrowers."3 4 s The Federal Reserve and
FDIC maintain a customer also could include the beneficiary of
an investment fund, a pension fund, a company whose assets are
managed by an asset manager, or a controlling shareholder of a
closely-held corporation.3 4 6 The regulations and preambles are
conspicuously silent on what a customer does not include, for
example, shareholders of publicly-traded corporations or of
widely-held non-publicly traded businesses.
Further, the
regulators state that in some cases persons with the know-yourcustomer obligation might need to obtain information about the
controlling owners of a business or other legal entity.3 4 7 Hence,
the definition of customer may have significant impact on many
fiduciaries. In this connection, the Federal Reserve and FDIC are
seeking comments on whether the proposed definition of
"customer" is adequate to include all persons who "benefit from
the transactions conducted at the bank, such as persons who
establish off-shore shell companies . . . or otherwise conduct

business through intermediaries."3 48
In addition, they seek
comments on whether the proposed definition of customer is too
wide and will unnecessarily include persons that pose minimal
know-your-customer risk, that is, whether additional regulatory
3 49
exceptions are appropriate.
At present, the proposed regulations do not have exceptions
for foreign banks, foreign broker-dealers, or foreign investment

342.

See Know Your Customer, 63 Fed. Reg. at 67,521-22.

343.

See KYC Rule

ll1 Give Enforcement Agents New InformationSources, 10

MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT 9 (1998).

344.
For the proposed regulation's definition of "customer," see supra notes
323-25 and accompanying text.
345.
Id. at 67,520.
346.
See id. at 67,518.
347.
See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP, Official Notices of Proposed "Know
Your Customer" Regulations for
Banks (Jan. 7, 1999), available at
<http://www.gibsondunninstitute.com/docs/Finlnst/fimema0l.htm>.
348.
Know Your Customer, 63 Fed. Reg. at 67,522.
349.
See id.
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advisors that are regulated in their home countries or in certain
home countries that have sufficient anti-money laundering
countries. Similarly, no exceptions exist for foreign open-ended
collective investment funds such as mutual funds, which may
have thousands of investors. However, the regulators would
expect banks to identify the shareholders of a mutual fund
established in an offshore jurisdiction that has a limited number
of shareholders.3 5 0 In the case of accounts opened by mail or
Internet, banks and other covered persons must give special
attention to verifying addresses and telephone numbers, and to
use commercially available data sources3 5to verify the customer's
date of birth and social security number. '
The regulations require the bank to identify the beneficial
owners of account holders that are offshore private investment
companies, trusts, "private mutual funds," or investment
advisors-in other words, high-risk customers-and to maintain
data about the beneficial owner to the same extent as for U.S.
persons.3 5 2 In the event that banks maintain the documentation
about the identity of foreign beneficial owners, such as customers
of a foreign investment advisor or the principal of a personal
investment company outside the United States in a foreign
branch or holding company, regulators would require that the
bank furnish the documentation to a bank examiner in the
United States within forty-eight hours of the examiner's
request.3 5 3 No exceptions exist if bank secrecy or other law, such

as the EU privacy directive, would preclude providing the
documentation in the United States, especially with respect to
3 54
existing customers.
b. Opposition from Private Sector and Congress
On February 3, 1999, a dozen members of Congress
introduced four pieces of legislation:
(1)

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

H.R. 220- Freedom and Privacy Restoration Act
of 1999 to prohibit the federal government from
creating a national ID and medical ID by
repealing sections of the laws passed in 1996
and would prohibit the use of social security
numbers as an identifier.

See id. at
See id. at
See id. at
See fd. at
See id.

67,520.
67,519.
67,520.
67,521-22.
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(2)

(3)

(4)

H.R. 516- Know-Your-Customer Sunset Act of
1999 would bar agencies from following through
on proposed Know-Your-Customer regulations.
H.R. 518- Bank Secrecy Sunset Act would repeal
the law that gives federal bank regulators
monitoring authority and devolves the power to
the states unless Congress passes a better
version of the law.
HR 517- FinCEN Public Accountability Act of
1999 would let bank customers check their own
files and challenge information they believe to be
false or inaccurate.

On March 4, 1999, Comptroller of the Currency John D.
Hawke, Jr. testified that federal banking regulators' proposed
know-your-customer rules should be withdrawn at the end of the
public comment period. 3 s s Hawke said any marginal advantages
for law enforcement would be strongly outweighed by its potential
for inflicting lasting damage on the banking system.
Christie Sciacca, associate director of FDIC's division of
supervisor, also testified that his agency believes the "proposal
3 56
Sciacca
cannot become final in its current form, if at all."
explained that most comments from the banking industry
involved concerns about "the cost of compliance, customer
financial
privacy, and the competitive disadvantage if all
35 7
institutions are not subject to the same requirements."
At present, the status of the know-your-customer regulations
are uncertain and controversial.
3. International Standards for Accounting in Anti-Money
Laundering Campaigns
An

important

development

is

the

establishment

of

international standards for accounting in anti-money laundering
and financial crimes. 3 s 8 The goals of accounting, as defined by
the American Accounting Association, are to make decisions on
the use of limited resources, including crucial decision areas,
determine goals and objectives, direct and control effectively an
organization's human and material resources, maintain and

See Eileen Canning, Know-Your-Customer Proposed Rules Should Be
355.
Scrapped, OCC's Hawke Urges, DAILY REP. FOR ExEc., Mar. 5, 1999, at A-35, col. 1.
Id.
356.
Id.
357.
See Charles Klingrnan, Accounting for Money Laundering: International
358.
Perspectives (Jan. 7, 1998) (e-mail note, on file with author).
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report on the custodianship of resources, and facilitate social
3s 9
functions and controls.
Auditing encompasses the following three major categories:
(1) financial statement audit; (2) operational audit; and (3)
compliance audit.3 60 In particular, a compliance audit has as its
principal goal determining whether the entity under audit is
following procedures or rules established by a higher authority.
Both accounting and auditing include within themselves
certain fundamental notions on conformity with, and obedience
to, applicable legal authority. These basic concepts involve the
intersection of accounting and money laundering.
In every jurisdiction, accountancy contains long-standing and
deeply rooted requirements of impartiality, objectivity, and
accuracy, using uniform standards and principles, and a code of
mandatory professional ethics to support those obligations. These
obligations entrust accountants with the responsibility for
determining whether financial statements are free from material
misstatements, and for auditing internal controls and procedures
relevant to the production of those internal controls. The "core
competence" of accountancy in the area of internal controls and the
accountant's obligations for impartiality, objectivity, and accuracy
have led many countries to rely on accountancy in detecting and
preventing money laundering and financial crimes such as
361
fraud.
Training provides accountants with the requisite professional
tools and expertise to enable them to compare different entities
within a single industry and thereby detect certain anomalies.
Accountancy emphasizes operational knowledge of industries
audited and appropriate internal controls, applied to a particular
industry. A growing requirement in accounting jurisdictions to
combat financial crimes requires accountants to report
discoveries of serious abnormalities to higher authorities in
appropriate circumstances.
Worldwide accounting organizations have begun to give
guidance to their accounting professionals concerning money
laundering issues.3 62
However, little or no international
coordination has occurred, despite accountancy's overall global
harmonization and increasing emphasis on international
accounting standards.
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision of the Bank for
International Settlements has issued its Core Principles for

359.
360.
36 1.
362,

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
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Effective Banking Supervision. In particular, Principle 15 states
that "[b]anking supervisors must determine that banks have
adequate policies, practices and procedures in place, including
strict 'know-your-customer' rules, that promote high ethical and
professional standards in the financial sector and prevent the
bank being used, intentionally or unintentionally, by criminal
elements."3 6 3
In addition, Principle 14 provides that bank
supervisors must ensure that banks employ "appropriate
independent internal or external audit and compliance functions
to test adherence to" policies, procedures, practices and legal
requirements, which include know-your-customer and anti3 64
money laundering rules.
In the United States, the Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group
has established a sub-group, in coordination with appropriate
accounting organizations and headed by an industry expert, to

explore

appropriate

guidelines

within

the

United

States

3 65

concerning money laundering.
The group will explore issues
and develop guidelines or suggestions on how to effectively
provide useful guidance to the U.S. accounting profession on
money laundering.
Accounting bodies and researchers working on money
laundering problems have concentrated on six important issues:
(1) legal issues; (2) auditing issues; (3) internal controls; (4)
reporting obligations;
(5) effect on financial
statement
presentation; and (6) enforcement activity.
With respect to legal issues, all jurisdictions whose
accounting bodies have worked on accounting guidance
concerning money laundering have provided an explanation in
layman's terms of appropriate legal issues that an accounting
professional is likely to encounter.
For auditing issues, many accounting jurisdictions have
issued
a checklist of significant indicators accounting
professionals
can apply to potential money laundering
concerns.3 6 6 Such guidance assists accountants in effectively
performing their duties. Clear, specific guidance on standards
within an audit of potential money laundering are critical to the
accounting profession. While the technical specifics of accounting
standards may differ throughout the world, the indicators of
potential money laundering often do not. Use of harmonized
checklists and indicators are important since money laundering is

363.

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS:

BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING

SUPERVISION, Core Principlesfor Effective Banking Supervision 36 (Sept. 22, 1997)
available at <http://www.bis.org/press/index/htm>.
364.
Id.

365.
366.

See Klingman, supranote 353.
See id.
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often transnational; prevention and investigation thus may
require cooperation between accounting professionals in various
jurisdictions.
Comprehensive internal risk control assessment is critical to
application of auditing standards.
The Swiss and U.S.
professionals have provided effective models for internal risk
3 67
assessment with respect to money laundering.
Various jurisdictions have provided guidance as to the
obligations of an accounting profession when potential money
laundering is discovered. The guidance is divided between legal
requirements and ethical obligations to report. While accounting
professionals have ethical obligations of confidentiality toward
clients, exceptions apply with respect to reporting crimes, such as
money laundering.
With respect to the effect on financial statement presentation,
several jurisdictions have discussed such effect after discovery of
potential money laundering. The questions concern whether, and
to what extent, an accounting professional must report to the
audited entity the discovery of potential money laundering in the
financial statements. Conflicts may exist between ethical and
legal obligations of accounting professionals to disclose fully and
impartially all relevant or material information in a financial
statement on the one hand, and legal restrictions on the
notification to unauthorized personnel of potential money
laundering on the other.
Enforcement of accounting standards in money laundering is
largely self-regulatory and authorizes a self-regulatory body to
impose sanctions.
One accounting jurisdiction has already
imposed sanctions on a member based on money laundering and
in the absence of any legal sanctions against that member. The
accounting professional can play a critical role in preventing
money laundering, especially in the development and application
of internal controls and the assessment of risks. International
cooperation
is
critical to effectively
combating
money
3 68
laundering.

367.

See id.

368.

Until now, the countries known to have provided or to be in the process

of providing

guidance specifically intended

for the accounting professional

regarding money laundering are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,

and the United States.
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IV.

CASE LAW AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

In many countries around the world, major litigation is raging
over the implementation of national anti-money laundering laws,

often continuing for five years or more. For instance, the antimoney laundering litigation in the early 1990s in Luxembourg
over assets of the Cali cartel in Luxembourg generated
simultaneous litigation in Panama and New York, and
subsequently resulted in criminal proceedings against one of the
U.S.-based attorneys for the Cali cartel over his conduct in
handling the case. The broad nature of money laundering laws
means that it can, and often is, added by U.S. prosecutors as a
charge whenever a crime has been committed involving the
transfer of money, property or both. Moreover, the technical
distinctions in money laundering statutes sometimes can be
3 69
important internationally.
A. Antigua Government Announces the Failure
of a Russian-Owned Bank

During the first week of August 1997, the Government of
Antigua and Barbuda announced the failure of the European
Union Bank (EUB)-a fraud warning-and appointed Coopers &
Lybrand as the receiver of a Russian-owned bank.3 7 0 The
Antiguan Government further announced that it was pursuing
Serbeveo Ushakov of Texas and Vitali Papsouev of Ontario,
Canada, two Russian nationals who founded EUB and are
believed to have fled. 3 71 According to a media report, Evan
Hermiston, resident manager in Antigua of Coopers & Lybrand's
Caribbean branch, said the Antiguan Government had asked his
372
firm to start investigating the bank during mid-July.

Hermiston delivered a report during the first week of August.
The webpage established by EUB on the World Wide Web
invited depositors to take advantage of "excellent interest rates,
offered in a stable, tax-free environment, with utmost privacy,

369. See the discussion of United States v. Dynar [1997] 2 S.C.R. 461, infra
notes 383-97 and accompanying text.
370. See George Graham & Canute James, Antigua Hunts Russians as
'Bank'Fails,FIN. TIMES, (London), Aug. 9-10, 1997, at 3.

371. See id.
372. See id. According to one media report, "Antigua had become one of the
Caribbean's most notorious havens for shady banks, but the government earlier
this year launched a bid to clean up the sector." Id.
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confidentiality and security." 3 73 In October 1996, both the Bank
of England and the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency issued
3 74
warnings on EUB's operations.
Two Russians, Aleksandr P. Konanikhin and Mikhail B.
Khodorovsky, founded EUB in June 1994. 3 75 They described
themselves as "brokers of oil, metals, and construction supplies
and officers of the Menatep Bank of Moscow. " 3 76 U.S. and British

officials allege the bank is linked to Russian organized crime.
According to U.S. officials, Konanikhin was arrested in the United
States on visa violation charges and is accused of embezzling
more than $8 million from a Moscow bank. Both Konanikhin and
Khodorovsky have since severed their formal connections with the
EUB. Two other Russians, Ushakov and Papsouev, who have
disappeared, were listed as the bank's directors when it
3 77
collapsed.
As part of EUB's marketing on its now dormant Internet
webpage, 3 78 the bank stressed the benefits of the lax regulatory
climate. The webpage announced that "[s]ince there are no
government withholding or reporting requirements on accounts,
the burdensome and expensive accounting requirements are
reduced for you."3 79 EUB's Internet webpage allowed clients
anywhere in the world to open accounts, transfer money, write
checks by computer, and obtain credit cards twenty-four hours a
day.
Although
the
Antiguan
Government
is
claiming
confidentiality laws and has declined to provide information
regarding the number of depositors at EUB or the amount of
money it had reported in accounts, bank records show the bank
violated the rules almost from the start. 38 0 Indeed, in October"
1995, an official letter from the Ministry of Finance noted that the
bank had failed to file an audited financial statement for 1994.
In May 1997, the Idaho Department of Finance "declared the
bank to be operating illegally" and ordered it to "stop soliciting
deposits from Idaho residents over the Internet."38 1
As a result of international pressure-that is, the warnings
issued by the Bank of England, the OCC, and the U.S. State

373.
374.

Id.
See id.

375.
See Larry Rohter, New Bank Fraud Wrinkle in Antigua: Russians on the
Internet,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1997, at A4.
376. Id.
377.
See id.
378.
See The European Union Bank at http://www.eubank.ag (website no

longer active).
379. Id.
380. See Rohter, supranote 375, at A4.
381. Id.
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Department-the Antiguan Government closed another five
Russian banks established in Antigua and issued new anti-money
3s 2
laundering regulations.
The combination of the U.K. and U.S. warnings and the latest
problems experienced by EUB clearly hurts the reputation of
38 3
Antigua and Barbuda as stable and secure environment.

Indeed, overreliance on secrecy and insufficient regulatory
frameworks and supervision can undermine stability. Ironically,
secrecy and lack of regulation also focus the attention of foreign
regulators and international financial organizations on financial
institutions in such jurisdictions. Nevertheless, since the British
Government has closed many of the offshore banks and financial
institutions in the Caribbean Dependent Territories, and since
more traditional jurisdictions such as Panama and the Bahamas
have tightened their own vetting and regulatory processes,
unsavory characters and organized crime have targeted countries
whose frameworks and vetting processes are comparatively
liberal.
John E. St. Luce, the Antiguan Finance Minister, has claimed
that his government has passed strong legislation on anti-money
38 4
laundering and has a committee reviewing these developments.
Earlier statements from the Antiguan Government stating that it
had remedied the problems of offshore banks, however, have
3 8S
proven to be mere rhetoric and little substance.
On May 6, 1998, the U.S. Attorney filed an indictment in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida charging
"the Caribbean American Bank of Antigua and eight individuals
with a loan scam that allegedly bilked more than $60 million from
hundreds of people in ten countries and with related money
laundering."3 8 6
The indictment seeks as one remedy the
38 7
forfeiture of all the bank's funds and assets.

382. See Graham & Canute, supranote 370, at 3.
383. For background, see Antigua to Clean Up Banking Image, COM. CRIME
INT'L 6 (Apr. 1997).
384. See Rohter, supranote 375, at A4.
385. For prior discussions on Antiguan statements, see Antigua Wil Close
Five Russian Offshore Banks and Tighten Vetting, 13 INTL ENFORCEMENT L. REP.
129 (1997); Antigua Appoints Adviser to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking and Money
Laundering, 12 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 340 (1996).
386. U.S. Indicts and Seeks Forfeiture of Antiguan Bank for Loan Scam, 14
INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 314 (1998).
387. See id.
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B. CanadianSupreme Court Orders Extradition
for U.S. Money Laundering Sting
On July 26, 1997, the Canadian Supreme Court reversed the
Ontario provincial appeals court and held that a Canadian citizen
should be extradited to the United States.3 8 8
On a dual
criminality issue, the Court concluded that the failed sting
38 9
constituted the offenses of attempt and conspiracy in Canada.
Arye Dynar, a Canadian citizen, was the subject of a U.S.
money laundering investigation during the 1980s. In 1990, the
FBI in Nevada began recording telephone conversations between
Dynar in Canada and a cooperating informant in the United
States known as "Anthony." According to the Court, "Mr. Dynar
3 90
agreed with alacrity to launder money for Anthony."
Moreover, these conversations indicated that the money to be
laundered was drug money.3 9 1 However, as it was a government
sting, no real drug money existed. Dynar refused to travel to the
United States. Instead, it was determined that Dynar's associate,
another Canadian citizen named Maurice Cohen, would meet with
Anthony's associate in Buffalo, New York, collect the money, and
return it to Dynar in Toronto where it would be laundered. Cohen
would return the laundered money less, of course, Dynar's
commission. Cohen entered the United States and met with
undercover U.S. law enforcement agents. No money was
transferred, and the FBI aborted the operation by pretending to
3 92
arrest one of the undercover officers.
Subsequently, the United States sought the extradition of,
Dynar on a two-count indictment returned in Las Vegas, Nevada.
The indictment charged Dynar and Cohen with violations of U.S.
money laundering laws of under the sting provisions of the U.S.
Code.3 9 3 The first count of the indictment accused "both Dynar
and Cohen of attempting to conduct a financial transaction
involving property represented by a law enforcement officer to be
the proceeds of drug dealing and the second count accused the
two of conspiring to do so."3 9 4

388.

See Kirk W. Monroe, CanadianSupreme Court Reinstates Extraditionfor

U.S. Money Laundering Sting, 14 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 3 (1998) (discussing
United States v. Dynar [19971 2 S.C.R. 461).
389.
See id.
390.
Id.
391.
See id.
392.
See id.
393.
See 18 U.S.C.A. §1956(a)(3) (West Supp. 1999).
394.
Monroe, supra note 388, at 3.
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The United States requested the extradition of Dynar from
Canada in 1992.395 Following an extradition hearing, Dynar was
ordered committed for extradition. Dynar appealed to the Ontario
Court of Appeal.
The Ontario Court of Appeal reversed and set aside the
extradition on the basis that there was a lack of dual criminality
under Canadian law.3 9 6 According to the provincial appeals
court, Dynar did not commit a crime under Canadian law because
at the time of the activity no sting provision existed. 3 97 As such,
the money must in fact be derived from the commission of a
crime.3 9 8 The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court framed the issue before it in this way:
The issue in this appeal is whether the respondent's conduct in
the United States would constitute a crime if carried out in this
country, thereby meeting the requirement of "double criminality"

which is the precondition for the surrender of a Canadian fugitive
for trial in a foreign jurisdiction. This issue requires the Court to
consider the scope of the liability for attempted offenses and
conspiracy under Canadian criminal law, specifically, whether
impossibility constitutes a defense to a charge of attempt or
399
conspiracy in Canada.

A majority of the Court ruled that "Dynar's conduct would
have amounted to a criminal attempt and a criminal conspiracy
under Canadian law."4 °0 Even though Dynar's plan, if successful,
would not have constituted a violation of the substantive criminal
law in Canada at that time, the Court found that "the steps that
Mr. Dynar took towards the realization of his plan to launder
money would have amounted to a criminal attempt and a criminal
conspiracy under Canadian law."40 1 As a consequence, the Court
ruled that the trial court was correct in holding Dynar
extraditable on both the charge of attempt to launder money and
40 2
conspiracy to launder. The extradition order was reinstated.

395.
396.

See United States v. Dynar [1997] 2 S.C.R. 461, 470.
See id. at 479-80. For a discussion of the Ontario Court of Appeal

decision, see Kirk W. Monroe, CanadianAppeals Court Refuses to Extraditefor U.S.

Money Laundering Sting, 12 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 138 (1996).
397.
See Dynar, [1997] 2 S.C.R. at 479-80. This law has since changed.
Effective May 14, 1997, the Parliament of Canada effectively enacted a sting
provision by amending the existing money laundering statute's knowledge element

to include "believing." See R.S.C., ch. 46, §462.31(l) (1985).

398.
399.

See Dynar,[1997] 2 S.C.R. at 479.
Id. at 469.

400.
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Id. at 485.
See id. at 523.
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C. United States and Mexico Duel over Money Laundering Case

A case that illustrates the tension over international money
laundering and corruption between the United States and Mexico
is a case resulting from a sting operation conducted by U.S.
authorities primarily against Mexican banks. On May 18, 1998, a
federal grand jury in Los Angeles charged three Mexican banks
and twenty-six Mexican bankers with laundering millions of
dollars in drug profits. 40 3 According to an announcement by
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and Attorney General Janet
Reno, the charges represent the first time that Mexican banks
and bank officials were directly linked to laundering U.S. drug
proceeds for the Cali cartel of Colombia and the Juarez cartel of
Mexico. 40 4 The indictment was the culmination of "Operation
Casablanca," a three-year undercover sting operation led by the
U.S. Customs Service that resulted in the arrests of twenty-two
bankers from twelve of Mexico's nineteen largest banking
institutions. The indictment indicated gaping loopholes in U.S.
and Mexican laws that permit traffickers to move their proceeds
relatively easily in spite of various anti-money laundering and
reporting laws and regulations in both countries. 40 5
The
loopholes have been widely reported by law enforcement
authorities. This section outlines some of the highlights of the
investigation, the indictment, responses by the Mexican
Government, and its consequences for U.S.-Mexican law
enforcement cooperation.
1. Indictment
The three Mexican banks charged were Bancomer and Banca
Serfin-Mexico's second- and third-largest banks, respectivelyas well as Banca Confia, a smaller institution recently bought by
Citibank.40 6 On May 18, 1998, the Federal Reserve Board
announced it was filing civil actions against five banks with
branches in the United States.
Shortly after the indictment, Banca Serfin announced it
would plead not guilty and asked William Isaac, former Chairman
of the FDIC, to conduct an independent investigation of the
accusations.

403.

See Don Van Natta, Jr., U.S. Indicts 26 Mexican Bankers in Laundering

of Drug FPunds, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1998, at A6.
404.

See id.

405.

See Julia Preston, Mexicans Belittle Drug-Money Sting, N.Y. TIMES, May

20, 1998, at A6.
406.

See Van Natta, supranote 403, at A6.
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In a statement announcing the indictment, Secretary Rubin
said that "[b]y infiltrating the highest levels of the international
drug trafficking financial infrastructure, [U.S. Customers officials
were] able to crack the elaborate financial schemes the drug
traffickers developed to launder the tremendous volumes of cash
acquired as proceeds from their deadly trade."4 07
Attorney
General Reno said that "the arrests and seizures disrupted a
major money laundering operation that had served as an engine
40 8
of the international drug trafficking trade."
Since its start in November 1995, the undercover sting was
kept secret from the Mexican Government. On May 18, 1998,

Mexican officials first learned of the investigation when Reno
notified Mexican Attorney General Jorge Madrazo Cuellar by
phone. 40 9 Secretary Rubin also alerted his counterpart, Jose
Angel Gurria Trevino, Secretary of Finance and Public Credit in
Mexico.
U.S. authorities said that they discovered nearly 100 bank
accounts in the United States had been used by drug traffickers
to deposit laundered funds. On May 18, 1998, investigators
seized those accounts that they estimated to hold approximately
4 10
$122 million.
The investigation began after the U.S. Customs Office in Los
Angeles discovered that drug cartel members had laundered
proceeds from U.S. drug sales in branches of Mexican banks near
the border. The investigation grew to include the financial
infrastructure of the Ciudad Juarez cartel.
During the
investigation, Customs Service undercover agents established a
front company, the Emerald Empire Corp., with offices in the Los
Angeles suburb of Santa Fe Springs, and posed as middlemen
between the cartel financial directors and the Mexican bankers
(mostly mid-level executives), who agreed, for a fee of four or five
percent, to launder funds. The bankers had established phony
accounts and used bank drafts to evade money laundering
regulations.
The indictment indicated gaping loopholes in U.S. and
Mexican laws that permit traffickers to move their proceeds
relatively easily in spite of various anti-money laundering and
reporting laws and regulations in both countries. 4 11
The
loopholes have been widely reported by law enforcement
authorities.

407.
408.
409.
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According to the indictment, between February 1997 and
May 1998, Confia branch lawyer Miguel Barba Martin and
employee Jorge Milton Diaz managed to direct $11 million in drug
money deposits into false accounts and transfer the funds into
easily cashed bank drafts and other instruments. 4 12 At one time,
Reyes Ortega warned Victor Manuel Alcala, alias Dr. Navarro, an
alleged capo for the Juarez cocaine cartel, that the new Mexican
banking rules would make it more difficult to launder money in
Mexico.
Hence, in late 1996, $650,000 from one deposit turned up
belatedly in a phony business account established in the Cayman
Islands as part of the scheme. "New accounts in false names were

regularly opened and closed in various offshore locales to avoid
detection." 4 13 For instance, Alcala is alleged to have established
"a textile company as a front in Tepatitlan, which opened
accounts at Banoro, where the branch manager also proved
4 14
helpful."
On May 18, 1998, the Federal Reserve issued "'cease and
desist' orders against five foreign banks, including two of those
under indictment, for failing to address serious deficiencies in
their anti-money laundering programs." 4 15 The banks are Banca
Serfm, Bancomer, Banamex and Bital of Mexico and Banco
Santander of Spain, each of which operates offices in the United
States. 4 16 The Federal Reserve order requires the banks to
implement new anti-money laundering procedures.
2. Mexico Will Prosecute U.S. Agents Who Operated Sting
Attorney General Madrazo Cuellar accused the United States
of deceiving Mexico by making officials there believe that the
entire three-year undercover operation had been conducted inside
4 17
the United States.
President Ernesto Zedillo ordered his diplomats to deliver the
protest after he determined that conducting a hidden operation
on Mexican soil violated the terms of several agreements between
the two countries as well as the spirit of the close bilateral
relationship.

412.

See James F. Smith, Town Is Unlikely Star of Money-Laundering Probe,

L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1998, at Al.
413. Id.
414.

Id.

415.
David Rosenweig & Mary Beth Sheridan, Mexican Banks Indicted in
Drug Money Probe, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 1998, at Al.
416.
See id.
417.
See Julia Preston, Mexico Faults U.S. Secrecy in Bank Sting of Drug
Profit, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1998, at A3.
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On May 21, 1998, the Mexican Permanent Commission,
which represents Mexico's Congress when it is not in session,
voted unanimously to demand an investigation into "Operation
Casablanca" and criticized possible intervention by U.S.
agents. 4 18 On June 3, 1998, the Mexican Government advised
the United States that it would prosecute U.S. Customs agents
and informers who executed an undercover money laundering

operation in Mexican territory and would seek the agents'
4 19

extradition in connection with the charges.
At a meeting on June 1, 1998 in Caracas, Venezuela, Foreign
Secretary Rosario Green of Mexico handed to U.S. Secretary of
State Madeleine K. Albright a list of Mexican laws that the
Customs agents violated according to preliminary results of
In news interviews, Secretary Green
Mexican investigations.
reported that "Mexico is preparing to accuse the agents of
entrapment, engaging in money-laundering, and usurping the
authority of Mexican law enforcement."4 20 Meanwhile, Secretary
Albright acknowledged that ties with Mexico had been damaged at
4 21
a meeting of the Organization of American States in Caracas.
In the aftermath of the indictments against Mexican banks
and bankers resulting from "Operation Casablanca," Secretary
Green has stated that Mexico now has evidence that U.S. agents
The
broke Mexican laws during their investigations. 42 2
inducement of illegal acts, apparently conducted during the threeyear money laundering sting when U.S. agents posing as drug
traffickers persuaded Mexican bankers to launder alleged drug
profits, violates Mexican law.42 3 As a result of the U.S. handling
of the investigation, the whole structure of U.S.-Mexican antidrug cooperation will be reassessed in future meetings with U.S.
officials.
Mexican officials are angry that indictments were issued only
against Mexican banks and bankers, while U.S. banks named in
The indictments "also
the investigation went unindicted.
reinforced perceptions of corruption in Mexican law-enforcement
institutions and undermined efforts by the Zedillo government" to
strengthen Mexican agencies responsible for monitoring and

combating money laundering.

424

See Mexicans Lament the Timing of U.S. Operations on Money
418.
Laundering,FIN. TIMES (London), May 22, 1998, at 4.
419.
See Julia Preston, Mexico to Prosecute U.S. Agents Who Run an AntiDrug Sting, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1998, at A5.
420.
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421.
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422.
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3. U.S. Response on its Lack of Notification to Mexico
In January 1996, U.S. officials informed Rafael Estrada
Samano about the operation and asked for his help. 4 2 s
Separately, however, U.S. officials gave a less detailed
presentation to a deputy finance minister, Ismael Gomez Gordiflo.
Although U.S. officials asked Estrada to conduct a joint
investigation, he did not respond and the United States
abandoned the idea. Attorney General Madrazo Cuellar has said
that the United States was vague about the operation and asked
Gordillo only for information on some Mexican bank accounts,

which he provided. 426 Yet, U.S. customs officials grew suspicious

about the lack of response they received from Mexican officials. 4 2 7
Julie Shemitz, an Assistant U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles,
stated that U.S. officials did not share any information about the
operation with Mexico while it was under way out of fear for the
safety of the undercover agents. 4 28 Shemitz said "[it's not that
we don't trust Mexicans. We just didn't tell anyone. This kind of
operation is so dangerous, and you can't play games with the lives
of the officers. " 4 2 9
4. Summary and Conclusion
As a result of the indictment, hopes of obtaining diplomatic
protection for U.S. law enforcement agents have been discarded.
Similarly, thoughts of following up on the investigation are
43 0
fading.

425.
See Tim Golden, U.S. Drug Sting Riles Mexico, Imperiling Future
Cooperation,N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1998, at Al.

426.

See id.

427.

See id.

428.
See Preston, supra note 419, at A3.
429. Id. For instance, "One Customs agent working under cover was shot
and wounded in a shootout between narcotics traffickers and police officers in
New York City on August 6, 1997." Id.
430.
See Golden, supra note 425, at Al. A few suspects who could not be
lured to the United States have been arrested in Mexico. One of the most
important, Enrique Mendez Urena, an investment banker who was said to have
worked for Carrillo Fuentes, a former alleged head of a major Mexican drug cartel,
died of extensive head injuries following his arrest in Puerto Vallarta. See id. "The
state police, who apparently arrested him, said he had been acting strangely and
had hurt himself in jail." Id.
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V. CRIMINAL AND QUASI-CRIMINAL

TAX DEVELOPMENTS

Professionals involved in international wealth transfer
techniques must be aware of developments in international tax
enforcement. Moreover, practitioners working in international tax
enforcement must be aware of several important trends.
Recently concluded and ratified tax treaties indicate the trend
toward more active enforcement and cooperation within such
treaties and increased merging of provisions from treaties of
mutual assistance in criminal matters with traditional tax treaty
provisions. 431 The United States has concluded several treaties
with key countries used in international tax and estate planning,
such as Switzerland, Austria, Luxembourg, and Ireland. These
43 2
treaties contain active enforcement cooperation provisions.
The trend toward increased unilateral assistance in tax
enforcement affects clients and practitioners in sometimes
unexpected ways. While U.S. tax authorities have been in the
forefront, many other countries, sometimes under pressure from
multilateral development banks in the context of structural
readjustment programs, are conditioning loans on better tax
administration and more active enforcement. 43 3
Multilateral
development banks are also making effective tax administration
part of their good governance programs. In recent years, the
unilateral extraterritorial tax enforcement has manifested itself in
draconian reporting requirements for foreign persons, foreign
trusts, and persons who expatriate, such as surrendering their
434
citizenship.
A growth area in international tax enforcement concerns preand post-judgment attachment, seizure, and freezing of assets.
Increasingly, tax officials recognize that in an interconnected

world at the end of a controversial tax dispute the ability to move
funds instantly may make for a hollow victory unless tax
authorities have the means to seize the funds in dispute or obtain
sufficient security in lieu of the funds. 43 s
Increasingly, the tax and non-tax enforcement areas are
interacting. In this regard, tax enforcement officials and law
enforcement officials are cooperating in an effort to combat the

431.
See generally Bruce Zagaris, Developments in Mutual Cooperation,
Coordination and Assistance Between the U.S. and Other Countries in International
Tax Enforcement, 27 TAx MGMT. INTL J. 506 (1998).
432.
See id. at 506-07.
433.
See id. at 515.
434.
See id. at 504.
435.
See id. at 510-12.
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threats from transnational crime, especially transnational
43 6
organized crime.
An engine of increased international tax enforcement is
multilateral tax cooperation. International organizations, such as
the OECD, economic integration groups, and ad hoc groups are
developing novel enforcement cooperation approaches and a more
institutionalized approach. 43 7 In particular, the OECD Harmful
Tax Competition report has significant implications for fiduciaries
4 8
operating internationally.A

VI. AssET FORFEITURE
From the beginning, one goal in anti-money laundering and
other anti-crime initiatives has been to immobilize criminals and
their assets by identifying, freezing, tracing, seizing, confiscating,
43 9
and forfeiting the instrumentalities and proceeds of the crimes.
Some countries, such as the United States, have active criminal,
administrative, and civil asset forfeiture programs. 4 40
Some
prosecutors prioritize asset forfeiture over criminal prosecution of
defendants, especially in cases in which prosecution of
defendants may not be possible.
Two Swiss cases discussed below indicate the increasing
cooperation by the Swiss Government in assisting foreign
governments prosecute corruption cases against former high level
officials. The discussion below of the Mexican Government's
seizure of accounts illustrates how many governments that
traditionally have not had active anti-money laundering programs
are now implementing new programs.

A. Swiss Freeze $13 Million of Bhutto Accounts
On October 15, 1997, the Swiss police announced that it
identified SFr20 million (U.S. $13.6 million) in frozen bank
accounts belonging to the family of former Pakistani Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto, in connection with corruption
inquiries. 4 4 1 During the weekend of October 10-11, 1997, Bhutto

436.
See id. at 512, 515.
437.
See id. at 515.
438. For background on the OECD Report and its implications, see Bruce
Zagaris, OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition: Strategic Implications for
CaribbeanOffshore Jurisdictions,17 TAX NOTES INT'L 1507-18 (1998).
439. See Zagaris, supra note 431, at 510.
440. See id. at 512.
441.
See Jimmy Bums, Swiss Find 98.4m in 'Bhutto Bank Accounts', FIN.
TIMES, (London) Oct. 16, 1997, at 20.
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denied for the first time that the Swiss accounts belonged either
to her or to her relatives. 442 Bhutto had been fired as Prime
Minister in November 1996 on charges of corruption and misrule.
As a result of the freeze order that followed the provisional
blocking of the assets-a preventive measure taken the month

preceding the freeze-the assets will remain frozen until the end
of the investigation.
The Swiss authorities responded to a formal request for
judicial assistance from the Pakistani Government. Pakistani
investigators claim that the Bhuttos have deposited between $5080 million in Swiss bank accounts. According to Falco Galli,
Swiss federal police spokesman, the Swiss police "have not
443
excluded the possibility of freezing more accounts."
According to Galli, the Swiss police froze seven accounts in
seven different Geneva-based banks in three stages-on
September 8, September 17, and October 8, 1997. The owners of
the frozen accounts are Bhutto, her husband, Asif All Zardari,
and her mother, Nusrat Bhutto. Senator Saifur Rehman, who
heads
a
Pakistani
government
corruption
commission
investigating the affair, said that he would visit Switzerland to
give evidence to Swiss authorities and request the freezing of
more accounts.
The freeze orders and provisional blocking of funds, along
with the Swiss actions in the Mobutu case 444 and the overriding
of bank secrecy in dealing with the accounts related to the
Holocaust, indicate a new environment of Swiss cooperation with
respect to foreign asset forfeiture cases. Nevertheless, the Swiss
will act only in response to an actual criminal investigation and a
request for judicial assistance, mutual assistance, or both, in
connection therewith. 445
The Swiss action indicates the increased cooperation by
governments when they are requested to provide assistance in
corruption cases. Until the mid-1990s, governments and courts
were reluctant to act in corruption cases, especially when they
concerned former high level officials or political leaders.
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B. Swiss Supreme Court Forfeits Portionof Marcos Money
On December 10, 1997, the Swiss Supreme Court, in a
landmark decision after eleven years of litigation, ruled that $100
million of assets belonging to the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos
must be returned to the Philippines Government, provided certain
conditions are met." 6 The decision applies to $100 million of the
$500 million frozen in Swiss bank accounts since Marcos'
abdication in 1986.
According to Peter Cosandey, the Zurich District Attorney, a
decision on the disposition of the remaining funds would be
forthcoming. 4 47
The court ordered that the money be placed in an escrow
account at the Philippine National Bank, which is partly owned by
the Philippine Government. Provided certain conditions are met,
the court has ordered that the funds held by Swiss Bank
Corporation must be transferred to the Philippine courts, which
will decide how to distribute them. 448 The same decision will
apply as well to the funds held by Credit Suisse, which are
44 9
subject to the jurisdiction of another Swiss canton.
The order reverses prior rulings that the disputed assets
could not be released until Imelda Marcos, who also claims the
money, was convicted by a Philippine court. 45 0 While she has
been convicted and sentenced to a total of forty-two years for
corruption, Marcos has not served time in prison. Instead, she is
an active member of Congress.
To ensure the transfer of the money, the Philippine
Government must demonstrate and guarantee that the money
"will be distributed by a court complying with the United Nations
standards of legal process." 4 5 '
The order also requests
information "about deliberations on the award of the money and
measures being taken to compensate victims of human rights
452
abuses under the Marcos regime."
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448.
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The ruling represented a setback for approximately 9,500
victims of international human right violations during the Marcos

regime who have already obtained a judgment but are trying to
levy against many of the same assets that the Philippine
Government is seeking. Approximately one week before the order,
a U.S. federal appeals court dismissed a lawsuit by Philippine
human rights victims who had also made claims upon the money
in the Swiss banks. 45 3 The court ruled that the Swiss decision to
block the Marcos accounts forestalled any action on the matter by
45 4
U.S. courts.
In 1994, a U.S. federal jury in Hawaii found the Marcos
Administration guilty of murder, torture, and violations of the
provisions of international human rights conventions. 45 5
It
awarded the plaintiffs $1.2 billion in damages. But the pendency
of the court actions by the Philippine Government left Swiss
courts and banks in a quandary. While they feared having to pay
twice, they wanted to demonstrate that they would not protect a
corrupt government that had stolen so much money over a long
period of time.
Activity is underway in Manila to resolve the dispute between
the Philippine Government and the Marcos family. The initiative
is led by Magtanggol Guunigundo, chairman of the Philippines
Presidential Commission on Good Government, which was
established by former President Corazon Achino in 1986 to
recover assets fraudulently amassed under Marcos and the
Marcos family. Now, both the government and the Marcos family
have said they want a final settlement. 4 S6 However, differences
regarding the amount of Marcos assets still outstanding
complicate such a settlement.
The decision represents a victory for those wanting to pursue
civil prosecution against corrupt politicians, even when the assets
are moved to foreign jurisdictions in which strong secrecy laws

predominate. The effort to forfeit the Swiss assets of Marcos was
especially difficult because the environment to penetrate and
forfeit assets of government corruption was much less developed
in the late 1980s than today. The case is also a precursor to
future efforts to pursue the assets of corrupt leaders.
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C. Mexican Seizure of GaxiolaBank Account Signals
New Cooperationand Tension in Anti-Money

LaunderingEnforcement Cooperation
Testimony by U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence H.
Summers before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
March 12, 1997, as well as other reports, indicate that the
Mexican and U.S. Governments are actively cooperating in
freezing and seizing assets, and on prosecuting money
laundering, although tension exists over the effectiveness of the
45 7
cooperation.
On January 8, 1997, the United States requested that the
Mexican Government freeze assets belonging to a drug-trafficking
suspect, Rigoberto Gaxiola Medina. 45 8 The United States believes
that substantial amounts of money may have flowed out of the
account after the freeze request was made, perhaps because of
corruption and a tip-off. Rather than seizing $183 million, only
$16.7 million was frozen and seized.
According to a media report, two confidential chronologies of
the case produced by U.S. officials show that agents of Mexico's
National Institute for Combating Drugs did not act on the
January 8, 1997 order until January 20. 4 59 Another problem was
that the Mexican official in charge of executing the order was
Colonel Jose Felix Name, the Institute's chief of investigations.
Name has been under suspicion since he was arrested and
charged with allowing Humberto Garcia Abrego, a man accused of
being one of Mexico's most important money launderers, to
4 60
escape from custody.
When Mexican authorities reported to the U.S. Customs
Service on the Gaxiola case, they reported that the accounts in
question were depleted and only about $16.7 million remained.
Mexican officials argued that the $183 million requested seizure
did not take account of the frequent withdrawals Gaxiola had
461
made over a thirty month period.
According to media reports, on March 11, 1997, at a meeting
of law enforcement officials of the two countries in Mexico City,
Assistant U.S. Attorney General Mary Lee Warren protested the

457.
For background, see Tim Golden, The Missing Drug Millions: Just a
Misunderstanding?, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 1997, at A3 (discussing the money
laundering case of drug trafficking suspect Rigoberto Gaxiola Medina).
458.
See id.
459.
See id.
460.
See id.
461.
See id.
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apparent disappearance of the money.4 62
However, a senior
Mexican Justice official who was present said "in no way" did the
4 63
United States complain about the matter.
Mexican officials have stated that Gaxiola's accounts
contained only $393,000 on December 31, 1996. 4 6 On January
10, 1997, just before the Mexican Government moved to seize the
accounts, the accounts contained $1.47 million. After the money
was frozen on January 23, 1997, the combined balance was up to
$16.7 million. 4 65 These new deposits seem to rebut allegations of
a tip-off.
The case indicates that, despite the tension between the two
governments, progress is occurring in establishing legal and law
enforcement framework to freeze assets in Mexico. The next push
will come in the effort to enforce Mexico's anti-money laundering
laws.

VII. MUTUAL ASSISTANCE, BRIBERY, DRUGS, AND
OTHER CRIMINAL COOPERATION MECHANISMS

Increasingly, practitioners must be aware of an ever-growing
web of bilateral and multilateral treaties, executive agreements,
and memoranda of understanding that enable governments and
law enforcement officials to obtain information on various crimes.
Sometimes tax crimes are covered. For instance, all the modem
U.S. mutual assistance in criminal matters treaties cover tax. On
October 21, 1998, the U.S. Senate voted to approve for ratification
thirty-nine
treaties
providing
for
international
criminal
cooperation, including nineteen mutual assistance in criminal
matters treaties, eighteen extradition treaties, and one prisoner
466
transfer treaty.
The evidence law enforcement officials need to prosecute tax
crimes is often the same evidence that is required to show
wrongdoing with respect to securities or commodities futures
trading, drug trafficking, or transnational bribery. For instance,
the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, which took effect
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466.
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INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 404 (1998) (discussing the scope of the treaties in some

detail).
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on February 15, 1999, obligates signatory countries to provide
evidence in connection with alleged bribes of foreign public
officials and eventually will require all signatories to eliminate tax
46 7
deductions for payments that are bribes.
Similarly, in the investigation
and prosecution
of
transnational organized crime, many law enforcement officials can
obtain evidence on a variety of economic matters.
Many
governments, such as the United States, target alleged
transnational organized crime members for tax crimes, as the
United States did successfully with Al Capone. 46 8

VIII.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELATED PROTECTIONS

Proactive policing vis-&-vis transnational organized crime has
produced transformations in international criminal cooperation
law in the United States and throughout the world, especially in

the development of a financial enforcement regime. 4 69

Anti-

money laundering and immobilization of the assets and profits of
criminals play an important role in these efforts. Globalization
ensures that the number of transnational criminal investigations
and prosecutions involving the United States will increase.
Undoubtedly, an increasing number of cases will bring into play
the potential applicability of the various rights guaranteed by the
U.S. Bill of Rights or applicable provisions of international human
rights conventions, such as the International Civil and Political
Covenant. 4 70 "The tension between the need for the United States
to cooperate more with national governments and international
tribunals and the concern for the fulfillment of constitutional and
international human rights standards is likely to continue to
grow."

4 7 1

Counsel representing investors, business entities, and
fiduciaries can increasingly resort to international human rights
provisions-in national judicial fora, international tribunals, or
both-to adjudicate conflicts between new intrusive law

467.
See OECD Anti-Corruption Convention Will Take Effect on February 15,
1999, 15 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 13 (1999) (discussing the specific

requirements of the Convention).
468.

For background on the international criminal cooperative mechanisms
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InternationalCooperationagainst TransnationalOrganized Crime, 44 WAYNE L. REV.

1401 (1998); Special Issue: The United States InternationalCrime Control Strategy, 4
TRENDS INORGANIZED CRIME (1998) [hereinafter U.S. InternationalCooperation].
469.
U.S. InternationalCooperation,supranote 468, at 1447.
470.
See generally Michael Abbell & Mark Andrew Sherman, The Bill of
Rights in TransnationalCriminalLitigation,THE CHAMPION 22-29 (1992).
471.
U.S. InternationalCooperation,supra note 468, at 1448.
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enforcement techniques and substantive laws and international

human rights and constitutional rights. These conflicts often
result in intrusive search and seizure cases, enforcement of new
due diligence requirements for businesses and individuals, asset
forfeiture cases, restraint of individuals at borders, and so forth.
The discussion of the restrictive provisions in U.S. mutual legal
assistance treaties (MLATs) and the efforts to conduct intrusive
search and seizure and evidence gathering without proper
safeguards illustrate the types of defenses that persons implicated
by these provisions can raise.
A. U.S. MLATs Restrict Their Use to Governments
Recent U.S. MLATs in criminal matters that grant the
government compulsory process rights, as delimited by the
respective treaties, expressly state that the treaties do not create
the right for a private person to obtain evidence. 47 2 The purpose
is to prevent the use of its MLATs for suppressing or excluding
evidence or for impeding its investigations. 47 3 Hence, if an
adversely affected person wants to prevent the execution of a
request that he believes was made in violation of the treaty, his
only recourse under the treaty is to the executive authority of the
requested country, not to its courts. Similarly, if he wants to
contest that the requested country violated the terms of the treaty
in executing a request, he may do so only to the executive
4 74
authorities of the respective countries.
The treaty provisions do not prevent a person adversely
affected by a request or its execution from asserting whatever
rights he has under the laws of the appropriate country in its
courts. For instance, a person whose home or place of business
was searched and whose property was seized under a search
warrant issued pursuant to a treaty request may assert whatever
rights he has under the laws of the requested country to prevent
that property from being turned over to the requesting country.47 5
Similarly, a person whose records have been subpoenaed
pursuant to a treaty request may assert whatever rights he has

under the laws of the requested country, to prevent the
production of those records, their transmittal to the requesting
country, or both. An affected person would also presumably be
able to seek to enjoin the requested country from taking an action

472. See Michael Abbell & Bruno A. Ristaj, 3 INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
ASSISTANCE § 12-4-7(2) (Supp. 1997) (discussing the use of mutual assistance
treaties to obtain evidence).
473. See id. § 12-4-7(1).
474. See id.
475.

See id.
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not authorized by the treaty or its laws. 4 7 6 In at least one case in

which a defendant sought to use a U.S. MLAT to obtain evidence
from a treaty partner pursuant to a treaty that was silent with
respect to a defendant's right to seek evidence under it, "the trial
court directed the Department of Justice to make a treaty request
477
on behalf of the defendant."

The U.S. Government has agreed to provisions in its MLATs
that accommodate concerns of its treaty partners about
safeguarding provisions on international human rights. For

instance, in the MLAT between the United States and Australia
signed on April 30, 1997, the term "essential interests" that may
be invoked to deny assistance to a requesting state includes a
discretionary limitation on providing assistance in death penalty
47 8
cases.
Potential remedies for rectifying apparent violations of
binding provisions of international human rights include the
following: to urge governments and international organizations to
condition applicable MLATs, extradition treaties, and other
international criminal cooperation agreements to comply with
such provisions; to urge judicial tribunals through amicae briefs
to condition criminal cooperation agreements on international
human rights obligations; and, where appropriate, to help
aggrieved persons initiate and prosecute actions in international
human rights fora in order to reflect equitably their respective
contributions.
B. The FourthAmendment Right Against
Unlawftd Search and Seizure

"All searches and seizures in the U.S. must fulfill the"
requirements of the Fourth Amendment." 4 7 9 Hence, a search
warrant issued pursuant to a treaty request must fulfill U.S.
constitutional
requirements
regarding
probable
cause,
specification of the place to be searched, and specification of the
48 0
things to be seized.
The majority of U.S. mutual legal assistance treaties in
criminal matters specifically provide authority to U.S. courts to

476.

See id.

477.

Id. § 12-2-1(2) (discussing the request made by the Department of

Justice to Switzerland in the case of Michele Sindona).
478. See Treaty with Australia on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
April 30, 1997, U.S.-Austl., S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-27, at VI (1997) (discussing

Art. 3(I)(c)).
479.
U.S. InternationalCooperation,supranote 468, at 1453.
480. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; see also United States v. Merchant
Diamond Group, Inc., 565 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1997).
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issue search warrants in execution of requests for assistance
under such treaties. 48 1 While some of treaties do not expressly
confer such authority on U.S. courts, they still require the United
States to conduct searches and seizures at the request of its
treaty partners if the request contains information justifying such
action under U.S. laws. 48 2 "The absence in some cases of specific
statutory authorization raises the issue as to whether those
treaties sufficiently authorize the courts to issue such
4 83
warrants."
In a decision that has potentially important implications for
international criminal cooperation, the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California held that a freeze of a target's bank
account of a U.S. securities enforcement investigation is
unconstitutional as violative of the Fifth Amendment right to due
process and the Fourth Amendment right to be protected from
4 4
unreasonable seizures. 8
The case began as a derivative action of an Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement action. The SEC sued
one of the plaintiffs, Michael Colello, for his role in a pyramid
scheme. 48 5 Colello asserted his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination during the investigative stage and has
48 6
continued to maintain his silence.
The day before the Commission filed the enforcement action
against Colello and the other defendants, the SEC sought the
freeze Colello's Swiss bank accounts. 48 7 The U.S. Department of
Justice transmitted a request under the U.S.-Swiss Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters Treaty48 8 and Swiss authorities
48 9
complied.
Simultaneously with the SEC enforcement action, the court
issued a temporary restraining order in the enforcement action,
freezing all the defendants' assets located in the United States,
including Colello's. 4 90

The court, in a decision by U.S. District

Judge Richard A. Paez, refused to grant the SEC's motion for a
preliminary injunction against Colello, and the domestic asset
freeze dissolved along with the temporary restraining order.4 9 1

481.
482.

Abbell & Ristaj, supra note 477, at § 12-4-8(3)).
See iU. § 12-6-1(1)).

483.

U.S. InternationalCooperation, supranote 468, at 1454.

484.
485.
486.

See Colello v. SEC, 908 F. Supp. 738, 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
See id. at 740.
See icl.

487.

See id.

488.

Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, U.S.-

Switz., 27 U.S.T. 2019.
489.

See id.

490.
491.

See Colello, 908 F. Supp. at 740.
See id. at 742-43.
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Colello and plaintiff Robert Romano-who was not a
defendant in the enforcement action-filed a separate case on
September 2, 1994 to challenge the constitutionality of the Swiss
asset freeze, Colello and Romano named as defendants, among
others, the SEC, its lawyers, and the Director of the Department
4 92
of Justice Criminal Division's Office of International Affairs.
The SEC had commenced its investigation in October 1993
against Cross Financial Services, Inc. (CFS) after discovering
through a newspaper article that CFS promised very high rates of
return to investors in a "government receivables" investment
program. 4 93 On December 3, 1993, the SEC issued a formal
4 94
order of investigation.
In April 1994, the SEC subpoenaed records and testimony
from Michael Colello in connection with the investigation of
CFS. 4 95 During his testimony, when SEC lawyers questioned
Colello about Carroll Siemens, letters of credit, European and
American banks, and his bank accounts, he asserted his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to
answer.

496

On June 13, 1994, the Department of Justice sent a request
under the U.S.-SWiss treaty for assistance from the Swiss
Government, "seeking documents and testimony from banks in
Switzerland to establish whether CFS made false statements
about its investment scheme to induce people to invest and,
thereafter, misappropriated investors' funds in violation of U.S.
federal securities laws." 4 97 In addition, the SEC requested that
any funds "traceable to the subject matter of the request be frozen
so that the funds later may be returned to the U.S. to compensate
4 98
the victims of the fraud."
On June 15, 1995, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court rejected
plaintiffs' contention that the asset freeze was improper. 4 99 It
explained, "[In matters of judicial assistance, the Federal
Supreme Court examines an administrative court complaint only
to determine whether the preconditions for the provisions of
judicial assistance have been fulfilled."5 0 0
If the judicial
assistance is requested by the United States, the request cannot
be denied merely on the basis of deficiencies in the U.S.

492.

See id. at 740.

493.
494.
495.

Id. at 741.
See id.
See id.

496.

See id.

497.

Id. at 741-42.

498.
499.
500.

Id. at 742.
See id. at 743.
Id. at 743-44.
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proceedings, because the treaty does not contain any
50
corresponding provision. '
Meanwhile, in ruling that the freeze was an unconstitutional
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution,
the Colello court rejected the government's contention that
plaintiffs "assumed the risk" of depositing their money in a foreign
country. The court stated that U.S. citizens are protected by the
Bill of Rights from incursions by the U.S. Government on them or
their property, regardless of its location.5 0 2 Similarly, the court
found no authority for the government's notion that it "can
circumscribe or limit the entitlement of citizens to constitutional
50 3
rights via a treaty."
The court was troubled that freezing is permitted under the
treaty based on "reasonable suspicion," whereas the Fourth
Amendment requires showing "probable cause."5 0 4
The court appeared troubled by the failure to implement
legislation and regulations, although legislation was initially
contemplated.5 0 5
The court also noted that, while the
Department of Justice manual governs the conduct of the SEC
and the Department of Justice, it does not require them to notify
"the subject of a Treaty request or to provide a hearing before or
after making the request."5 0 6

Additionally, the court noted that

the manual contains no standards and includes a disclaimer
stating that the manual provides only internal Department of
Justice guidance and "is not intended to, does not, and may not
be relied on to create any rights, substantive or procedural,
enforceable by law by any party in any matter civil or criminal." S0 7
Finally, the manual states that no limitations are placed "on
otherwise lawful prerogatives of the Department of Justice."5 0 8
The absence of U.S. statutory and regulatory provisions
contrasts with Switzerland's approach.5 0 9
Switzerland has
enacted law and guidelines under the treaty. The Federal Law on
the Treaty with the U.S. on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters of October 3, 1975 provides for certain "precautionary
measures" to guarantee due process through requiring notice to

501. See id at 744.
502. See id. at 754.
503. Id. at 754.
504. See id. at 754-55.
505. See id. at 751.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. See Nathalie Kohler, The Confiscation of Criminal Assets in the United
States and Switzerland, 13 Hous. J. INTL LAW, 1 (1990) (providing an analysis of
the Swiss approach to the confiscation of assets).
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the affected parties.5 1 0 In addition, the Federal Office for Police
Matters (FOPM) has also issued guidelines to inform interested
authorities and citizens on what is meant and encompassed by
international mutual assistance in criminal matters.5 1 1
The decision may presage trouble on other criminal mutual
assistance agreements when the U.S. Government tries to enforce
them in courts. Indeed, although the American Bar Association

and other interested bar groups testified previously against
excluding from such treaties due process protections for
defendants and third parties, the U.S. Government vehemently
opposed such arguments.5 12 The decision seems to indicate that
at least the court believes that a better balance is constitutionally
513
required.
A similar difficulty may arise in the tax information exchange
and cooperation area. There, in order to secure support for
ratification of the Council of Europe and OECD Treaty on Mutual
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, the U.S. Department of
Treasury
promised to issue regulations and stated that it would consider
extending such regulations across the board to all tax information
exchange agreements. Indeed, such due process seems compelled.
However, many months after the Convention has taken effect,
Treasury officials claim that their workload does not permit time for
such a project. It appears that the role of courts can be important
in developing incentives for officials to prioritize due process rights.
The absence of adequate rights within enforcement cooperation
treaties, together with aggressive enforcement actions and the
inevitable cases where rights of individuals have been abused, may
5 14
jeopardize the potential for success in enforcement actions.

IX. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS

International anti-money laundering efforts will increase as
transnational crime and especially transnational organized crime
continue to spread. The efforts of the United Nations and the G-7

510. See Colello, 908 F. Supp. at 746.
511. See id.
512. See Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Concerning the Cayman Islands,
Hearing, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. Exec. Rept. 100-26, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess., resolution of the American Bar Association, at 186-90; Statement
of Bruce Zagaris, 166-68, 205-12; S. Rep. No. 100-26, at 166-68 (1988); Teresita
Ferrera, Second MLAT Hearings Spark Debate on Policy Issues, 4 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 197 (1988); Bruce Zagaris, Sen. Helms' Inquiries over
IndividualRights in MLATs Delay Mark-up, 4 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 160 (1988).
513. See U.S. InternationalCooperation, supranote 468, at 1457-58.
514. Id. at 1458.
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Economic Summit Group to develop a convention and other
mechanisms to tackle transnational crime illustrate the political
consensus behind the new efforts.
Some of the prospects for international anti-money
laundering efforts can be viewed in the March 1997 release of the
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), which
contains a large section on anti-money laundering.5 1 5 It is
worthwhile to summarize some of the discussions in order to
identify trends, as well as develop and improve due diligence.
In October 1995, the United States initiated Presidential
Decision Directive 42, which freezes assets and imposes economic
sanctions against certain persons designated as narcotics
traffickers affiliated with the Call cartel.5 16 U.S. agencies in 1996
assessed which money laundering and financial crime situations
affected U.S. national security interests, including drug
trafficking, contraband smuggling, arms sales, terrorist financing,
sanctions violations, and sales of weapons of mass destruction.
In some cases, teams of U.S. officials visited governments to
5 17
secure agreements on actions needed.
FATF achieved progress through starting the second round of
mutual evaluations of each of its twenty-six members. FATF also
warned its own members of shortcomings, especially Turkey and
Greece.5 18 FATF approved proposals to update its universallyaccepted Forty Recommendations to reflect new typologies and
methodologies.5 19 Additionally, the Caribbean FATF started
evaluations on its members. In Asia, an outreach program was
initiated.
Finally, a common forum for major international
bankers and government policy makers was organized. s 20
In 1997, FATF's high-impact initiative external relations
program that began in 1992 and 1993 succeeded in establishing
agreements with the Council of Europe, the Offshore Group of
Banking Supervisors, and the CFATF. 5 2 1 These agreements are
intended to secure evaluation by outside experts to determine
whether the majority of financial center countries were properly
implementing the minimal global standards on anti-money
22
laundering.5

515.
See BUREAU OF INT'L NARcOTIcs & LAW ENFORCEMENT
INTERNATIONAL NARcOTIcs CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 539 (1998).

AFFAIRS,

516. See id. at 548-49 (describing the objectives of Presidential Decision
Directive 42).
517.
See id. at 548.
518.
See id.
519.
See id.
520.
See id.
521.
See id. at 512.
522.
See generally id. at 511-12 (reviewing the significant developments in
the money laundering sphere in 1996).
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During 1996, increased cooperation with foreign governments
on major money laundering cases occurred.
Asset sharing

cooperation increased, as did the amount of U.S. mutual
assistance treaties in criminal matters, all with important anti-

5 23
money laundering and asset forfeiture-sharing provisions.
Adverse developments identified by the INCSR include the
further penetration of financial systems by organized crime
groups.5 2 4 Transnational crime groups increasingly have used
"new drug transit routes across ever more remote countries, most
of which have no or few anti-money laundering laws."5 2 5 The
result is the ability to move crime proceeds to the countries and
systems whose financial standards are vulnerable and easily
manipulated. Transnational crime groups can more easily identify
and exploit "the differential between the levels of compliance with
international anti-money standards," especially in Asia and Latin
5 26
America.

A. New LaunderingModes
One development is that as new drug trafficking routes are
spawned in Africa and the lower regions of the old Soviet regime,
the list of countries more vulnerable to money laundering widens.
Perhaps more dangerous is the absence of implementation of
anti-money laws or even ratification of the 1988 Vienna-U.N.
Drug Convention.5 2 7 The INCSR lists Aruba, Colombia, Mexico,
the Netherlands Antilles, Nigeria, Singapore, Turkey and
Venezuela. Just as important, the anti-money laundering laws
that governments enacted in the early 1990s are now no longer
sufficient, especially given the increase in non-drug crimes, the
use of new technologies, and more sophisticated ways to move
26
money6
The proliferation of financial crimes include the more
common types of financial frauds and new variations, especially

the use of prime bank guarantees, phony or fictitious letters of
credit, counterfeit or stolen bonds, and other monetary
instruments offered as surety for loans, and other scams. Some
of the new methods include the use of secret telex codes for bankto-bank transactions in order to move $42 million in cash from

523.
524.

See id. at 512.
See id.

525. Id.
526. Id.
527. See id. (identifying INCSR lists Aruba, Colombia, Mexico, the
Netherlands Antilles, Nigeria, Singapore, Turkey, and Venezuela as countries that
have failed to meet these standards).
528. See id. at 513.
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the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in Jakarta.5 2 9 The use of fake
certificates of deposit drawn on other branches of an international
bank that can range from $10 million to $25 million recently
occurred.5 3 0
"'Fraudsters' will also use counterfeit letters of
agreement, drawn on bank letterheads, seemingly vouching for a
client from another branch of that bank," or confirming the
53 1
approval of a bogus deal.
The INCSR reports on the ways in which money is laundered.
Professional money launderers differ little in their money
management than corporate money managers. Money brokers
and transnational criminals collaborate to minimize their risk,
partly through diversification of the means to transport, convert
cash, or both, as well as to layer and integrate the laundered
53 2
funds.
B. Challengesto Anti-LaunderingEnforcement
Several aspects of contemporary banking make countermoney laundering initiatives difficult.
1. Correspondent Banking
Banking is increasingly global, inter-connected, and operates
twenty-four hours. Large multinational banks have global branch
and subsidiary networks as well as correspondent relationships.
Correspondent banking enables launderers to initiate
transactions through the weakest link in the bank.
Once
launderers start a bank relationship, they can quickly move
533
money globally within the bank.
2. Offshore Banking
At the June 1996 International Conference of Banking
Supervisors, banking supervisors from 140 countries agreed to
adhere to twenty-nine recommendations "designed to strengthen
the effectiveness of supervision by both home and host-country
authorities of banks that operate outside their national
boundaries."5 3 4 The recommendations were incorporated into a
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See id. at 514.

530.

See id.

531.
532.
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See id. at 515-17 (providing a full explanation on how money is
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world's
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report by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, issued in
3
October 1996.5 5

Home supervisors must be able to assess "all significant
aspects of their banks' operations, using whatever supervisory
techniques are needed, including on-site inspections."5 3 6 Means
to overcome impediments to effective consolidated supervision are
suggested. The Basle report sets forth "guidelines for determining
the effectiveness of home country supervision, for monitoring
supervisory standards in host countries, and for dealing with
537
corporate structures which create potential supervisory gaps."
Additional guidelines are provided for host country supervision.
When the recommendations conflict with bank secrecy or
similar legislation in certain countries, supervisors have agreed to
use best efforts to amend the secrecy legislation. Countries with
further recommendations were reviewed prior to the international
meeting scheduled for October 1998.538
3. The Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors
The Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS) has
concluded "an agreement with FATF on a protocol for evaluating
the effectiveness of the money laundering laws and policies of its
members."5 3 9 However, OGBS includes only about half of the
5 40
known offshore banking centers among its members.
A concern exists that different kinds of charters for financial
facilities can be obtained for non-bank institutions-such as
international business companies (IBCs) -that can conduct some
of the same activities as banks and do not undergo the same
regulatory oversight.
This is a particular problem in the
Caribbean.5 4 1
4. Private .Banking
Much competition exists globally to attract high net-worth
individuals and companies as private banking clients. The
transactions of these clients are treated confidentially. Such
customers are treated with more deference and receive various
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types of personal services.5 42 A concern exists that, in the
competition to attract and maintain these clients, financial
antiinstitutions or their officials may suspend or not implement
5 43
money laundering and other due diligence procedures.
5. Cybercurrency
The use of microchip-based electronic money for financial
transactions, via smart cards and the Internet, has the potential
to revolutionize the means for laundering money. Some new
cyberpayments systems are engineered to be an electronic
emulation of paper currency. Cybercurrency has the attributes of
conventional currency: a store of value; a medium of exchange; a
numeraire; potential anonymity; and convenience. Other features
include transfer velocity-an almost instant electronic transfer
from point to point-and substitution of electrons for paper
currency and other physical means of payment. Cyberpayments
also include other payment components, such as cyberchecks,
cybercredit, cyberdebit, and so forth. This development requires
and
of microchip
the use
because
attention
close
telecommunications technologies adds some significant new
dimensions for law enforcement.
Cyberpayments also include other payment components,
such as cyberchecks, which emulate paper checks, cybercredit,
cyberdebit, etc.
Cyberpayments raise the issue of whether such payments
can be made subject to monetary reporting and supervision
measures. Law enforcement issues that will arise include fraud,
counterfeiting, and computer hacking. High-speed, worldwide
ability to trace
transfers add complexity to law enforcement's
S 44
criminal activity and recover illicit proceeds.
6. Other Challenges
Other challenges to anti-money laundering enforcement
include the counterfeiting of currencies and other monetary
instruments, especially bonds, the rise in contraband smuggling,

the acquisition of banks and other financial institutions by
suspected criminal groups, and the resort by criminals to the use
of smaller, pass-through banking, and electronic cash systems.
As a result of the occurrence of financial crimes and money

See id. at 520 (indicating that the fierce competition for lucrative
542.
private banking clients might lead to suspending bank rules on transactions).
See id.
543.
See id. at 520-21.
544.
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laundering with varying degrees of regularity in more than 125
jurisdictions, a continuing concern exists that some governments
still have not criminalized all forms of money laundering.
C. Continuing Concerns
One major remaining problem is the inconsistent
enforcement of anti-money laundering provisions.
Sixteen of the sixty-four eligible governments ranked as high,
medium-high or medium priority money laundering concerns by
the U.S. Government in 1997 have not ratified the 1988 U.N.
Convention.5 45
Hence, one-fourth of the world's important
financial center countries had not ratified this universal accord
six years after its entry into force.
Many governments "have not criminalized all forms of money
laundering and financial crime, nor given sufficient authority to
banking regulatory bodies." s " Too many governments still limit
"particularly
the
laundering
countermeasures,
money
requirement that the offense of money laundering must be
predicated on conviction for a drug trafficking offense."54 7 An
equally distressing number of govemments "still refuse to share
information about financial transactions with other governments
5 43
to facilitate multinational money laundering investigations."
In addition, a need exists for "enhanced bilateral and
multinational communications to inform governments and
financial systems in some systematic and ongoing way about the
methods and typologies of drug and non-drug related money
laundering and financial crimes."5 4 9
Concerns exist as well about "the concentration of economic
power in drug cartels and other criminal organizations, and its
potential translation into political power," especially in the
Caribbean, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, as well as the
Americas. 5s o
The growth of free trade agreements and regional integration
increases the opportunities to launder money.
Finally, countries that cooperate on money laundering
investigations and prosecutions need to share forfeited proceeds.
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D. Enforcement Agenda
A broad enforcement agenda is suggested.
Among the
recommendations are the creation of international standards,
agreements to exchange information, the establishment of
linkages for cooperative investigations, and methods to supersede
political resistance in various key countries to ensure such
cooperation.
Among the national laws required are those that establish
corporate criminal liability for bank and non-bank financial
institutions, apply to all types of financial transactions not limited
to cash at the teller's window, apply reporting and anti-money
laundering laws to a long list of predicate offenses not limited to
drug trafficking, criminalize investments in legitimate industry if
the proceeds were derived from illegal acts, and facilitate the
sharing of financial and corporate ownership information with law
enforcement agencies and judicial authorities.
The INCSR Report proposed the following sixteen action
items:
(1)

(4)
(5)

constant monitoring of money laundering
patterns, trends, and apologies;
improving analysis of money management
practices;
analyzing of non-drug-related money laundering
and other financial crimes;
equating economic power with political clout;
eliminating systemic weaknesses;

(6)

assessing the trafficker as entrepreneur;

(7)

analyzing the impact of money laundering on
national governments and economies;
regulating exchange houses and remittance
systems;
concentrating efforts for maximum effectiveness;
pursuing a continuously evolving strategy;
intensifying the UNDCP program to ensure that
all
significant
financial
center
countries
implement fully the anti-money laundering and
asset forfeiture provisions of the 1988 U.N.
Convention;
continuing the FATF focus, along with the
Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors and
other relevant
organizations,
on
offshore
banking;
adopting
of
information
standards
by
governments;

(2)
(3)

(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

(12)

(13)
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and

(15) exerting greater efforts by governments and
banking systems to identify and prevent a wide
range of financial crimes; and
(16) consolidating supervision of the international
55
banking system. '
The report indicates that the anti-money laundering regime is in
fu-swing globally.5 5 2 It will continue to deepen as an area where
international law, policymakers, scholars, practitioners, and
criminals and their advisers will occupy themselves for the
indefinite future with its developments.
In the short- and medium-term future, key national
governments and international organizations will increase their
financial enforcement efforts.
These endeavors will include
privatization of the law enforcement efforts, which in turn will
saddle the private sector with additional responsibilities and more
potential sanctions for non-compliance. The private sector will
need to monitor carefully these developments and participate in
the legislative and executive decision-making and in the work of
international organizations. If abuses occur and are imminent,
private individuals may want to consider judicial or other
challenges. In many cases, better networking is required within
the private sector to participate effectively in the shaping and
implementation of new policies and law, as well as the manner in
which they are implemented.
E. Private Sector Role
Globalization
means
that in the
next millennium
practitioners and fiduciaries must constantly strengthen their due
diligence against money laundering, fraud, and crime.
The
drawback is that it requires more attention, more work, and
perhaps more selectivity vis-A-vis new clients. Globalization also
means that the costs of international wealth transfer will rise,
provided clients can pay the load. Counseling transnational
clients in international wealth matters may be unduly risky for
professionals who do not exercise care and apply modern due
diligence. Professionals must stay abreast of a wide variety of
national, foreign, and international law developments. These
developments mean that the millennium indeed will be a brave
new world.
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